

BILKENT UNIVERSITY
INSTITUTE OF ECONOMICS AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

THE DISSOLUTION OF YUGOSLAVIA:
CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES

BY
ILIRIANA ISLAMI

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN FULFILLMENT OF THE
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS

SEPTEMBER, 1999

ANKARA

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
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ABSTRACT

During the history, national ideologies had impact on the nation building of the states. The case happened to be in the middle of the nineteenth Century, with the creation of the New Kingdom, that of the Serbs-Croats-Slovenes. New state was created in the Balkan Peninsula, after the fall of the two Empires, that of Ottoman Empire and that of Austro-Hungary. At the end of twentieth Century, national ideologies reappeared again and disillusioned the state. Analysis of the national ideologies that erupted in 1991 and broke-up the Yugoslav State forms the core part of this study. Analyses are going to be focused as well, in the negative outcomes of the national ideologies that were expressed in the war of Slovenia, Croatia that of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and lastly in Kosova/o.

ÖZET

Tarih boyunca, milliyetçi ideolojiler ulus devletlerin kurulmasında etkili olmuştur. Olay, ondokuzuncu yüzyılın ortalarında yeni bir krallığın, Sırp, Hırvat ve Slovenya'luların krallığının kurulmasıyla yaşanmıştır. Yeni devlet, Osmanlı ve Avusturya-Macaristan İmparatorluklarının yıkılmasından sonra Balkan Yarımadası'nda kurulmuştur. Yirminci yüzyılın sonunda, milliyetçi ideolojiler yeniden ortaya çıkmış ve bu devleti parçalamıştır. 1991'de ortaya çıkan ve Yugoslav Devleti'ni parçalayan milliyetçi ideolojinin analizi bu çalışmanın ana amacını oluşturmaktadır. Analiz; Slovenya, Hırvatistan, Bosna-Hersek ve son olarak da Kosova'da savaşlarla ortaya çıkan milliyetçi ideolojinin olumsuz sonuçları üzerinde yoğunlaşacaktır.

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INTRODUCTION

The dissolution of Yugoslavia, has been one the most important events, that has shaken Europe after the Cold War. The dissolution of Yugoslavia for many scholars had been an issue to focus on, with particular interest. This interest was not only due to the wars that swept the country and caused a human tragedy, but because of the reluctance of the international community to intervene and stop the bloodshed. This was, particularly intriguing for me which led me to work on the dissolution. Why did it happen? When compared to the other Eastern Socialist countries, Yugoslavia was always one step further, while in the critic moments of the transition, all this states transcended the turbulent phase and went towards democracy, but it was only Yugoslavia that plunged into the civil war. For that matter, why the dissolution happened and the causes of the dissolution were my main preoccupations, and will constitute the main part of this study. While consequences are effects of these causes, and will be explained with the war of Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, the case of Kosova/o as a special issue in the process of the dissolution will be treated in the last chapter, especially the question of how Kosova/o will have an impact on the further dissolution of Yugoslavia (FRY: Serbia and Montenegro), has been answered.

Conflict in former Yugoslavia that erupted in 1991, essentially was as a result of nationalism, or better to say, result of emergence of competing national ideologies over the territory for their respective national groups. If we analyze the appearance of nationalism, we could say that, as a phenomenon, it contains two characteristics.

One with a positive attitude, and the other with a negative attitude. Nationalism has positive impact when it leads to the self- designation of the national identity. Opposite of that, nationalism gains negative characteristics when it is presented in that form that could be tantamount with ethnocentrism. The negative form is presented with the negative attitude towards other nations, considering the own nation as superior in relations with others. Nationalism that has positive characteristics could be part of a democratic process, while opposite of that, the negative characteristics could impede the democracy. When the matters are former communist societies, it would very easily lead to totalitarianism. The best case on the explanation of these forms of nationalism is the former Yugoslavia. Nationalism had impact on national awakening in the middle of nineteenth centuries and created the first state of Yugoslavia, while in the last decade of the twentieth nationalism disillusioned this state.

This study attempts to trace the line of nationalism that as a pivotal force, dominated the political scene at the late 80s, and created a situation that led to the break-up of nations. To elucidate the causes of a manifestation of nationalism of that time, what is needed is to give an overview of nationalism that appeared from the middle of the nineteenth century, and how this nationalism ignited the formation of the first Yugoslavia or Serbo-Croat-Slovene Kingdom. This matter will be explained in the first chapter. In this chapter we are not going to evaluate and give a deep analyses of the nationalism, but this issue would be examined so as to see the impact that it had on the running of the state apparatus of the Kingdom, and to analyze whether this breath of nationalism still exist in a different format in the 80s. To confirm this links, the best example would be to illustrate the program of Ilija Garasanin (1844), named as " Nacertanije". We shall not discuss the

program but only to mention it so as to have a clear view on Serbia's national programs, and involvement of Serbian intellectuals in the policy of 80s, especially in the last draft in form of a Memorandum by the Serbian Academy of Arts and Science, and the goals set for. To get into our main point, namely the causes of dissolution, we have to present a state of Yugoslavia after the civil war 1941-45, established under the leadership of Tito. How he was running this state and how this state functioned, how the national question was resolved, and the status of Albanians, shall be discussed in the second chapter.

Tito's Yugoslavia was established according to the principles of Socialist Federative System, comprising six republics and two autonomous provinces. The very genesis of this new state were based utterly on the model of the Soviet Union. After the expulsion of Yugoslavia from the Cominform of the Soviet Union in 1948, or as it was called the "expulsion for power", Tito chose an independent path, that of self management, that made this state distinguishable from the other socialist one. Tito's socialist system advanced rapidly compared to others socialist states. The privileged status of Yugoslavia helped decisively the geostrategic position, playing the role of "buffer zone" between the East and West, and the non-aligned movement, without being a participant neither in "Warsaw Pact", nor in "NATO". During this time state of Yugoslavia was a single state in which different national group cohabited. The national question, as the fragile issue, in Tito's Yugoslavia, from the CPY (The Communist Party) was regarded as resolved in a perfect manner, but in fact it was not. Even during Tito's time nationalism raised its head. The form in which they were manifested will be analyzed, in order to see, how this nationalism, after the death of Tito was performed in much more a brutal

sense, and the impact that it had on the dissolution. We will also discuss the position of Albanians in Yugoslavia during this time.

As long as Tito was alive, the socialist system functioned. Tito was the unquestioned arbitrator that ensured the unity of the state. After the death of Tito, the unsatisfied voices were raised. Some of the authors discuss, these grievances found fertile ground in the economic crises. For them, economic crises that exacerbated the Yugoslav system was the main cause that led the euphoria towards the dissolution. Some other authors argued that the main cause of these crises were of a political nature. How the economic factor along with self-management and the political one are interrelated in the Yugoslav crises, will be discussed in the third chapter. In this part we will give a brief overview of influence of the Kosova/o issue on the political crises. As we will see Kosova/o and Albanians were often sacrificed if not always, by other former Yugoslav republics, when it come to preserve their interest visa-a-vise Serbia. But for sure, the arrival of Milosevic in the political scene accelerated the negative course of events. How the policy of Milosevic had impact on the Serb nationalism, will be discussed in this chapter.

The outcome of this national euphoria was expressed in the first multiparty elections. Chapter III is reserved for explaining how these elections would affect the dissolution of the state, negotiations for the transformation of the state, the wars that swept republics, and at the end the Kosova/o case. Some of the authors argue that all the nationalist bear the same responsibility for the dissolution of Yugoslavia. These authors consider that Tudjman and Milosevic are equally guilty of the bloody dissolution. However closer examination of the dissolution seems to

suggest that perhaps Milosevic did not leave any room for diplomatic maneuver. The plan offered, for instance from the north (Slovenia, Croatia), was based on the principles of European models. This model ran counter to the intentions of Milosevic. This chapter tries to examine closely the turn of events and the consequences.

And the last part is reserved for our conclusions.

- Note, Kosova/o, both Albanian and Serbian spelling of the name are going to be used in this work for the sake of the impartiality.

CHAPTER I : THE HISTORY OF YUGOSLAVISM AND CREATION OF THE FIRST (KINGDOM) YUGOSLAVIA

1.1. On the Eve of the First World War and the Yugoslav Idea

"The past is indivisible from the future". These words by Cicero can be used as a guide to explain the links of the causes and consequences of the fatal break-up of the first Yugoslavia and the second one. In order to explain the break-up of the state, we will start with the creation of the first Yugoslavia in conjunction with the international environment of the time.

From the middle of the nineteenth century, nationalism was a strong force that prevailed in Europe for the new emerging states in consolidating their identity after the decay of two empires, that of Ottomans, and after, that of the Austro-Hungary Empire. Intrinsic to the Balkan peninsula was the nation-state formation that would be rendered much more difficult than in other European regions as will be discussed. Despite the problems in state formation, new entity of Yugoslavia created in the Balkan peninsula after the fall of the two empires became a very attractive place for the major powers which started to seek their piece of interest in the way they could grab.¹

The Ottoman Empire started decaying first. In Serbia, as the principal entity, in the

¹ Uwe Nerlich, "Balkan Security in the European Post-Cold War : Challenges and the Policy Choices for the West", *The Volatile Powder Keg, Balkan Security in the European post Cold War Environment*, 1994, (ed. by).F.Stephen Larrabe, Rand p.275

creation of Yugoslav state, the national awakening was the earliest. The first insurrection began in 1804 under the leadership of Karadjordje, and the second in 1815 under his successor Milos Obrenovic. With Russian backing they were able to secure Ottoman recognition of certain autonomous rights, and in 1830 gained full autonomy.² From this time, onwards the Serbs started establishing their institutions as well as formulating their national goals. The Serbs would be the only nation in former Yugoslavia to guide the political aims of theirs through nationalist programs.

In a different way, the former subjects of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the Croats, and the second actor in creation of the Yugoslav state, strove for a common state of the South Slavs based on their separate national identity within traditional (historic) boundaries.³ Among the Croats, the Yugoslav idea based on the South Slav unity and cooperation was very old. The idea has to be understood in the context of awakening the national ideologies that began forming during the last quarter of the eighteenth Century. The fervent advocator in the dispersion of the ideas was the energetic figure of *Ludevit Gay* (1809-1872), the leader of the so-called *Illyrian Movement*. The Movement was named "Illyrian" since he believed that the Croats were descendants of the ancient Illyrians. For him, the corner stone in construction of a single national south Slavic state was considered the language⁴. These ideas, based on the creation of a common state for all the Slavs,

² For Serbian National Awakening consult; Charles Jelavich, 1990, *South Slav Nationalism, Textbooks and Yugoslav Union before 1914*. Ohio State University Press. p.7-15 ; Wayne S. Vuchinich (eds.), 1982, *The First Serbian Uprising, 1804-1813*, Atlantic Research Publication; Stevan K. Pavlovich, 1999, *A History of the Balkans 1804-1945*, Longman, London and New York, pp.200-20

³ For Croatian national Awakening see:

Ivo Banac, 1984, *The National Question in Yugoslavia, Origins, History, Policy*, Cornell University Press pp.60-80

⁴ *ibid*, pp.76

did not have very much support among the Serbs. For some, these ideas were very hostile and were seen as an obstacle and "calculated to stop the expansion of the Serbia national consciousness to its rightful limits".⁵ The attitude toward Slavic cooperation in a new state for the Serbs was not acceptable since Vuk Karadjic, enlightened father of the Serbs, and Garasanin, the author of " *Nacertanje* " (the "Outline") had already disseminated ideas to the Serbs, that they should create a Slav state in which the Serbs should rule. This nationalism, fostered among the Serbs certainly differed from the nationalism cultivated in the North by Croatia and Slovenia.

Vuk Karadjic, the enlightened father of the Serbs, had a deep impact in boosting for the future nationalism among the Serbs. He laid down projects of Greater Serbia.⁶ These projects were based on the manipulation of the language along line of the dialects spoken in the territory of Serbia and Croatia. Along this line, Karadjic's ideas for a new Serb state were based on the *stokavski* dialect considering that the future Serbian state should encompass not only the Orthodox Serbs but also the populated areas in Croatian territories, excluding Zagreb, the center of Croatia, that spoke *jekavski* dialect. In explaining his view, Vuk Karaxhiq used Albanian nationality as a model. He argued that for the Albanians the religion is far less important than their common, that is, the Albanian nationality.⁷ Garasanin, the interior minister of the time (1844), in the same manner came up with the idea of a strong Serbian state and the idea that the Serbs should

⁵ Tim Judah, 1997, *The Serbs History, Myth and the Destruction of Yugoslavia*, Yale University Press New Haven and London, cit. pp.62

⁶ Duncan Wilson, 1970, *The Life and Times of Vuk Stefanovic Karadzic 1787-1864*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, pp.301

⁷ Micheal Micheal Petrovich, 1988, Karadzic and Nationalism, *Serbian Studies*, vol.4 no.3 Spring, pp.41-57

dominate regions gradually that were freed from the Turks and later from the Habsburgs.⁸

From this time onwards, until the break-up of the Second Yugoslavia, these ideas of Vuk Karadjic and Garasanin were nurtured for the construction of the future state of Serbia, with the aim of creating the Greater Serbia through territorial expansion by ethnically cleansing the non-Serbs who were considered as foreign elements. For the first time the idea "ethnic cleansing" was used by Vuk Karadjic himself as far back as 1806. He used the term to explain the expulsion of the Turks after the capture of Belgrade from them that year. The ideas had ramifications for the future. The Greater Serbia project entered this century accompanied in blood. All the political parties in Serbia save the Social Democrats supported the idea at the beginning of this century, almost in the same way as they had done it since the outset of the crisis in former Yugoslavia.⁹

Nationalism in state-formation of Eastern Europe differed very much from the Western one. Western nationalism was based on the ideas of liberty, equality, brotherhood and liberal democracy, accompanied with the ideas on constitutionalism, parliamentarism and tolerance. The ideas constituted a basis for an open and democratic society of the future. When these enlightened ideas were transplanted into the context of emerging states of Eastern Europe they were blurred in a search for the past myths and dreams. In this way the course of state formation was opposite from that already finished in the Western parts of Europe.

⁸ David Mackenzie, 1985 *Jlly Garasanin, Balkan Bismarck*, Boulder Colo: East European Monographs, 1985, pp. 42-61, 296

⁹ Aleksandar Pavkovic, 1997, *The Fragmentation of Yugoslavia, Nationalism in a Multinational State*, Macmillan Press LTD, pp. 44-45; Zoran Pajic, 1994, *The Former Yugoslavia*. In "Minority Rights in Europe: The Scope for a Transitional Regime" (ed. By Hugh Miall). *Royal Institute of*

The best case in explaining this process is former Yugoslavia.¹⁰ This difference of the perceived nationalism in the East and the West proved that the nation-states of Central and Eastern Europe were not model democracies, but unstable and ill governed.¹¹ This kind of nationalism, based on the past and the myths created, sped up the destruction of Yugoslavia after the end of the Cold War.

The necessity for taking concrete steps toward a new state of Yugoslavia were taken after the assassination of Archduke Francis Ferdinand by Gavrilo Princip during his visit to Sarajevo. This minor provocation seemed to be only a pretext, for which the Big Powers had been preparing for long, for starting World War I.¹² After the defeat of Germany and Austro-Hungary empire, Serbia with its allies were on the winning part. This was the immediate cause for the creation of the first Kingdom of Serbo-Croats-Slovenes. The effect of this new state marked the beginning of the de facto restoration of the Serbian Medieval Empire.¹³ Serbia with its allies was successful in throwing the Ottoman Empire almost completely out of the Balkans, and during the Balkan Wars 1912-1913, Serbia again won the war against Bulgaria and expanded its territory to the east including all of present day Macedonia and Kosova.¹⁴ The Serbs, being on the side of the Allies, considered

International Affairs, pp.56-66 ; Patric Cabanel, 1996, *Nation, Nationalities et Nationalisms en Europe: 1850-1920*, Editions Ophrys p.213

¹⁰ Zoltan D. Barany, The Roots of Nationalism in Post Communist Eastern Europe. *Balkan Forum*, vol.2 nr.2 March 1994 pp.117-118

¹¹ Joseph Rotschild, 1974, *East Central Europe between Two World Wars, History of East Central Europe*, vol.9: Seattle: University of Washington Press ch.VYugoslavia

¹² Vladimir Dedier, 1974, *History of Yugoslavia*, Mc Grow-Hill, INC. p. 467

¹³ Jovan Cvijic, "Studies in Yugoslav Psychology ", *Slavonic Review*, vol.9/ 1980-81,pp.668 ; James Gow, 1992, *Legitimacy and the Military - The Yugoslav Crisis*. St.Martin's Press New York pp.5

¹⁴ Stavro Skendi, 1967, *The Albanian National Awakening 1878 -1912*, Princeton University Press Princeton, New Jersey pp. 36-39

themselves as " Piedmont" or the "natural center" toward which all the others must gravitate in the (by them created) new Kingdom.¹⁵

The Croats, after defeating the Austro-Hungarian empire, rushed to create a new state. Putting aside the problem of Greater Serbia, to which the Serbs aspired, the Croats joined the Serbs in the liberation of the remaining territories. The Croats were well aware that they could lose their identity if they lived with Hungarians and Germans. The *Realpolitik* of the time was such that the best solution for the Croats and the Slovenes seemed to be in favor of uniting in a Yugoslav state. This was due to their internal social unrest, lack of a reliable army, and a very hostile international environment.¹⁶ On the other hand, after the defeat of Austro-Hungarian Empire, Italy's ambitions were directed towards a "Venetian Heritage".

¹⁷ This new situation would have either made Serbia a colony of Austria or, at the expense of Austria, would have rendered Serbia as the biggest power in the Balkans. The new Serb state indeed became only a cover name for the "Greater Serbia".¹⁸

The Yugoslav Committee, set up by Croatian émigrés, was an organ that proceeded the establishment of the new state. It was led by the spiritual leader Franjo Stupilo. He was afraid that Prime Minister Nikola Pasic of Serbia might bargain with the Big Powers to disfavor of the Croats and Slovenes.¹⁹ Pasic, a very crafty politician, directed all his diplomatic efforts to prevent recognition of a

¹⁵ David MacKenzie, 1994, " Serbia as Piedmont and the Yugoslav Idea 1804-1914", *East European Quarterly* 28,2, pp.153-82; David Mackenzie, 1996, *Violent Solutions (Revolutions, Nationalism, and Secret Societies in Europe to 1918)*, University Press of America

¹⁶ Dusko Sekulic, The Creation and Dissolution of the Multinational State: The case of Yugoslavia, *Nations and Nationalism* vol.3 no.2 1997 July

¹⁷ Mark Almond, 1994, *Europe's Backyard War*, Great Britain, Clays Ltd, st. Ives PLC, pp.116

¹⁸ Setton Watson, 1977, *Nation and States*, Methuen, London, pp.235

¹⁹ Dedijer, op.cit. pp.235

separate state of South Slavs emerging from Austro-Hungary.²⁰ Although different in their aims and interests, the Serb and Croat parties cooperated and voted for the Corfu Declaration in July 1917, based on the compromise between the position of the Yugoslav Committee and that of Serbia led by Pasic. Croats and the Serbs agreed that the new Slavic State agreed on a "Parliamentary monarchy headed by the Serb Karadjordjevic dynasty".²¹ The unity achieved in 1918 ran counter to the interests of the parties so that the compromise made there was relatively short. The practical political interests from the inception contained a seed of troubles that created a nucleus of the fragile basis for the new coming state.

After the fall of the two empires, that of the Ottomans and of Austro-Hungarian, the international environment had changed, and the balance of power shifted. Great Powers saw the creation of new states as a reflection of the security system set up in the Versailles Conference, that is, to prevent the German penetration to the East. They welcomed the new state of the South Slavs, instead of having too many of the states. The new state of Yugoslavia was regarded all the time as a "buffer zone" between Central Europe and the Middle East. (Drang-Nach-Osten). The combination of this factor with the internal one led to the creation of Yugoslavia in 1918. Taken separately, these two factors would not have led to its creation. The question whether Yugoslavia was an artificial creature, a long time debate among scholars,²² leads us to give a negative answer to it. Since it was based on interest of the parties, but of different nature, and the international community favored the

²⁰ Mihailo Crnobrnja, 1994, *The Yugoslav Drama*, Mc Gill Queen's University, pp.46

²¹ Ivo J. Lederer, 1963, *Yugoslavia at the Paris Peace Conference: A Study in Frontiersmaking*, New Haven: Yale University Press, pp.26; Ivan Muzic, 1969, *Hrvatska Politika i Jugoslavenska Ideja*, (*The Policy of Croatia and the Yugoslav Idea*), Split: "Franjo Kluz", pp. 105-131; J.F.Brown, 1992, *Nationalism, Democracy and Security in the Balkans*, Rand, pp.150-151

²² Sekulic, op.cit. pp.165-179; Zoran Pajic, 1994 "The Former Yugoslavia", In *Minority Rights in Europe*, op.cit., pp.56-66

common Slav state, one cannot say that it was an artificial creature'²³. Even the United States President Woodrow Wilson himself thought that it was the best solution for the South Slavs. This state of affairs made it easy for the Serbs to continue with their domination over Yugoslavia's state structures (army and the police) with the aim of achieving for goals of the Greater Serbia.

1.2. Political Economic And Social Hardships Of Yugoslavia

In order to explain the problems facing old kingdom of Yugoslavia, there needs to be made a distinction between those problems. Among them those based on ethnicity prevailed. Besides its mixed ethnic structure, other problems of economic and social nature had a strong impact on the Kingdom's overall development in the period between two World Wars. In retrospect, cultural differences that emerged from various religions of constituent nations of the Kingdom proved to be an effective marker of national or ethnic identity which, in turn, created distinctive customs, rituals and beliefs that shaped the everyday life of the citizens. This social variety would later be one of the incentives to encourage and revive the Serbian and Croat nationalism, particularly after the eighties.²⁴

Since its creation in 1918, the Kingdom faced troubles as to the way the state should be ran. Croats and Slovenes perceived the Kingdom as a federation between three constituent nations (the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes). Thus, the Croatian Peasant Party found in 1904 and based on the idea of encompassing all South Slavs within one state centered in Zagreb (Croatia), drafted a program in 1919 asking for the right to self-determination. The new program had been submitted to the Paris

²³ See for more on this issue, Ivo Ledrer, 1963, *Yugoslavia at the Peace Conference: A study in*

Peace Conference held after the First World War. The program stressed that the “Croats are separate nation and have national individuality within the ethnographical community of the South Slavs”.²⁵ The Croat ideas, represented mainly by the Croat Peasant Party, ran counter to the Serbian ideology. The latter was staunchly centered around the centralized government in Belgrade. Main supporter at the time had been Serbia's Prime Minister, Nikola Pasic. He saw the new Kingdom as a mere extension of the pre-war Kingdom of Serbia.²⁶ That implied that the Kingdom would be led by the Serbian dynasty from the House of Karadjordje. Against this background there eventually emerged a new Yugoslav constitution, adopted on 28 July 1921. The constitution established a centralized state that in essence denied the existence of various nationalities in Yugoslavia.²⁷

The Serbs controlled all political and military structures of the state while Croats and the Slovenes had little share. The Constitution simply served to sanction the authority of Karadjordje dynasty. His personal dictatorship primarily relied on the army, which was utterly under his control and fitted within his dreams of “Greater Serbia”.²⁸ Unlike Croats, the Slovenes did not play an important role in running the Kingdom. The reason was that Slovene's relationship to the Serb dynasty had been less conflicting than that of Croats.²⁹ Their insistence on the equality with the Serbs was not merely conflicting but also violent as well. The Croats pursued hidden and violent ways to challenge the Serbian hegemony. The *Ustasa Movement* was formed in 1929 and operated from the basis in Italy. It committed

Frontiermaking, Yale University, pp.3-80, especially pp. 3,24,26,35,45 and 57

²⁴ Aleksandar Pavkovic., 1997, *The Fragmentation of Yugoslavia*, pp.44

²⁵ Ivo Banac, 1984, *The National Question in Yugoslavia*, pp.240

²⁶ Mark Almond, 1994, *Europe's Backyard War*, pp 117

²⁷ Fredo Culinovic, 1956, *Drzavno Pravna historija Jugoslavenskih Zemalja XIX-XX vijeka*, vol.2, pp.242-252

²⁸ Philip J.Cohen, 1996, *Serbia's Secret War, Propaganda and the Deceit of History*, C,by Philip J. Cohen, pp.8-9

terrorist acts in the name of Croatian independence. One of the victims of that movement was King Karadjordje himself. He was assassinated on October 9, 1934. In fact, the Croatian movement was a direct response to the Belgrade repressive policies.

First terrorist acts against the Kingdom occurred, in fact, not in Marseilles but in Belgrade. Stjepan Radic, the leader of the Croatian Peasant Party, was murdered in the parliament in 1929, an act followed by the suspension of the constitution and the proclamation of a royal dictatorship on January 6, 1929. This new situation paved the way for the Croatian Peasant Party to pursue and, to a certain extent, achieve its political objectives. It did so, first by denouncing Serbian hegemony and, second, condemning multinational federalism. That culminated in an agreement between the Serbs and Croats establishing in 1939 an autonomous territory with Zagreb as its capital, known as "*Hrvatska Banovina*"³⁰

Another big and troublesome issue for the Kingdom was its non-recognition of other ethnic groups. It had within its borders of 1918 about two million minority citizens such as Albanians, the largest minority, even larger than one of the constituent nations of the new Kingdom (the Slovenes), Macedonians, as well as half a million Hungarians concentrated in the province of Vojvodina .³¹ The repressive policies against minorities provoked the creation of strong secessionist movements among them. In some cases, they allied with other movements of the Kingdom's constituent nations, such as the Macedonian IMVRO (International

²⁹ Carole Rogel, 1977, *The Slovenes and Yugoslavism 1890-1914*, Boulder, Colo. : East European Quarterly, pp.5-10

³⁰ Banac, op.cit, pp 87-8

³¹ Jozo Tomasevich, (and others), 1969, *Contemporary Yugoslavia, Twenty Years of Social Experiment*, (ed. by Wayne S. Vucinich), University of California Press Berkley and Los Angeles

Macedonian Revolutionary Organization) and the Croatian Ustasa Movement³² .

The position of the Albanians and that of the Muslims was the worst one. They were not allowed to practice their education in their mother tongue and they were forced to leave their ethnic territories *en masse*.³³

This ethnic heterogeneity of the Kingdom, with Serbian hegemony at its peak, needed a different political approach as opposed to those already in practice. Politically, the Kingdom failed to create a viable parliamentary monarchy of recognized Serb-Croat-Slovene nations and unrecognized ethnic groups of Albanians, Macedonians, and Muslims .³⁴

Economic side of the story in the new Kingdom was not any better compared to its ethnic part. The divisions existed between North and South of the state. This division in economic development was a result of diverse historical background. Slovenia and Croatia, as a part of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire, were suddenly thrown out of the European framework and put into a backward one .³⁵ On the other side, Serbia and the rest of the South East inherited a very poor economic base. Inability of the Kingdom to bring about a new balance between the richest and the poorest areas remained an obstacle for the development of the economy. It remained predominantly agrarian state exporting food products and raw materials.³⁶ This does not mean that the country was poor in its resources. Internationally, Yugoslavia remained a “normal” country of the capitalist

³² Vucinich, *ibid*, pp..5

³³ Hakif Bajrami, Piraku, *Kulturno Prosvetni Pokret*, p.36 ; Hugh Poulton, 1993. *The Balkans, Minorities and States in Conflict*, (Minority Rights Group 1991), pp.57-75 ; Hannes Treter - Joseph Marko- Tomislav Boric, *Perspektivat e Statusit te Ardshem te Kosoves*. (The Perspectives of the Future Status of Kosova) " *Thema*" 14, Pristine 1966 pp.217-218

³⁴ Vojislav Stanovcic, *History and Status of Ethnic Conflicts*. In " *Yugoslavia a Fractured Federalism*", 1988 (ed.by Dennison Rusinow), The Wilson Center Press; Washington DC

³⁵ Feron Bernard, *Yugoslavie: Origines d'un Conflict*. Paris ; Le Monde 1993

periphery in which market economy reigned for the mere reason that it was rich in mineral resources so that they were exploited by French, British, German and other international companies.³⁷

Being only the capitalist periphery, corruption was one of the features that characterized the Kingdom. This was yet another dissatisfaction that emerged within the new state. These issues, though, will not form part of this work.

1.3. The End Of Kingdom

The Serb-Croat-Slovene Kingdom, renamed as Yugoslavia in 1929, was a failed state from the inception. The reasons for this failure should be found in the ethnic tensions among its constituent nations and minorities.

Deeply dissatisfied with the regime and hegemony policy of Serbia, nationalist movements started organizing themselves. In addition to that of Croat's, nationalist movements among the Albanians and Macedonians emerged. During 1919 there was set up the Yugoslav Communist Movement (the CPY) through consolidating various South Slavic Social-Democratic Parties. It proved very successful for it was joined by various Yugoslav nationalities. For the success, an important role was played not only by the dissatisfaction with the Kingdom's policy but also due to the new space created after the successes of the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia. From its creation and especially during the years 1922-1924, the CPY cooperated with the nationalist movement in Croatia and backed Macedonians in organizing

³⁶ Ferdo Culinovic, 1961, *Jugoslavia Izmedju Dva Rata, (Yugoslavia Between Two World Wars)* (2 vols.), Zagreb pp.40-51

³⁷ Jozo Tomasevich, 1955, *Foreign Economic Relations*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, pp.188-193 ; Petranovic 1988 , *Istorija Jugoslavie, (The History of Yugoslavia)*, Beograd , Nolit, pp.56

the nationalist *IMRO*, with the program of self-determination for Macedonians and the creation of the Macedonian state. The CPY stood for the Macedonian state as “being free and independent and an equal member in a future Balkan Federation”.

³⁸ This policy of the Communists helped the Macedonians to later in 1945 gain the status of a nation.

Albanians as the most oppressed group continued their uprisings. Each rebellion during 1918 –1919, was suppressed by the Serbian army. The reason was that the areas of the present day Kosova/o, South Serbia and Macedonia. for many enthusiastic Serb nationalists were the territories where they had embarked on the final liberation of their lands from foreign rule as far back as 1912. ³⁹ At the same time these territories were seen as channels for further expansion since the real aim was deep penetration into the territory of post-1913 Albania, in order to get access to the sea, as outlined by many of their national programs.⁴⁰

Under pressure, though, the Albanians still continued their activities. In 1924 the “*Great Medrese*” of the King Alexander became a center of both nationalist and communist activity. Other illegal organizations as well operated within legally recognized youth clubs and sport organizations helping to disseminate the books smuggled from Albania. The most prominent ones were “*Agimi*” (Dawn) and “*Drita*” (Light).

Despite the Albanian dissatisfaction with their status in the Serb-Croat-Slovene Kingdom, the government of Albania was not in a position of aiding them. Albania was preoccupied with its own struggle for international recognition which

³⁸ Vuchinich, op.cit.3-58

³⁹ Stavro Skendi, 1967, *The Albanian National Awakening 1878-1912*

Yugoslavia continued to undermine well until the Conference of Ambassadors held in Paris. The Conference confirmed and internationally recognized Albania's frontiers.⁴¹ In the meantime, prominent Albanian guerilla leader *Azem Bejta* founded the *Komiteti i Mbrojtjes Kombetare Te Kosoves* ("Committee for the National Defense of Kosova"), with the principal aim of "encouraging an anti-Serb insurgency". *Azem Bejta* became a famous rebel leader (called *kacak*) by keeping his native *Drenica* region, the central district Kosova, in permanent revolt during the early 1920⁴². The same region once again in 1998 would be the place that triggered the insurgency against Milosevic regime, as we shall see in Ch.IV.

Another factor that ignited the revolt among the Albanians against the regime was the colonization of the Albanian inhabited territories. The policy was accompanied with brutality and police repression as well as other methods of expulsions of the Albanians. These methods of dealing with the Albanians were foreseen in the Serb national programs and they had to be fulfilled if there were to exist the ethnically pure Serbia.⁴³

Since the rights of Albanians and Macedonians were denied completely they were the most organized for their cause and for this reason they had to cooperate with each other. In November 1920 they signed a mutual agreement known as *Protegorov – Pristina*, named after the names of the two leaders. The agreement

⁴⁰ Piraku, " *Kulturno Prosvetni Pokret*"

⁴¹ J.Swire, 1971 *Albania-The Rise of a Kingdom*, Arno Press & The New York Times, New York

⁴² Nebil Duraku, " Grob 73 Metra Ispod Zemlje"(73 Metres Under the Earth), *VUS*, June 6, 1971, p.35

⁴³ A famous program of Vasa Cubrilovic(1937) was not implemented as a result of the events following the Second World War. John R. Lampe, 1996, *Yugoslavia as History, Twice There was a Country*, Cambridge University Press, pp.188 ; Rexhep Qosja, The Albanian National Question in the Serb Political Programs 1937-1944. " *The International Journal of Albanian Studies*" vol.1 no.1 Fall 1997, New York N.Y. Also available in internet, <http://www.Albanian.com> (IJAS)

committed the Albanians to the “liberation of Macedonia in its ethnographic and geographical frontiers”.⁴⁴

All these activities were organized as a result of the revolt against the supreme hegemony of the Serbs under the Kingdom. The Croats that agreed for the “*Croat Banovina*”, were not still satisfied. The agreement, known as “*Sporazum*” (Agreement) fulfilled their desire of being a privileged nation, but still it did not solve the national, agrarian or the social question of the Croats whose position remained even worse than in Austro-Hungarian times.⁴⁵ This was the reason that Croats, cooperated as well with the other groups, to bring over the hegemony of the Serbs.

All these differences exacerbated the Yugoslav state and its viability. On one side there were the Serbs with their aspiring policy of “State power”, without taking into account all differences that existed, while on the other all the non-Serbs and their national denial. These facts had a destructive impact on the Kingdom, that yielded only hatred and revenge. That speeded up the end of the Kingdom that had also been conditioned by the overall situation on the international scene. Following the signature of the German-Soviet Pact, Germany had a free hand in Western and Southern Europe. With the invasion of Poland, Yugoslav government signed the Tripartite Pact that led to a popular revolt. The government fell, and ten days later the German airforce began bombing Belgrade⁴⁶. The Bulgarian and

⁴⁴ Catherine Samary, 1995, *Yugoslavia Dismembered*, translated by Peter Drucker, Monthly Review Press pp.326

⁴⁵ Christopher Cviic, Croatia. In *Yugoslavia and After. A Study in Fragmentation, Despair and Rebirth*. 1996, (ed. by D.A. Dyker and I. Vejvoda), Longman, London and New York, pp.202

⁴⁶ Ferdo Culinovic, 1961, *Yugoslavia Izmedju dva rata. (Yugoslavia Between Two Worlds War)* (vol.II).p.183

Italian troops began advancing into the country. The state of Yugoslavia was temporarily at an end, but it definitely marked the end of the Kingdom.

Concerning the issue of why first Yugoslavia failed, the reason usually is found in that it did not have an obvious Bismarck or Cavour, Ataturk or Tito who would have imposed himself upon the “ new state”. Yet, the Kingdom’s failure has deeper roots than it may be seen at first sight and the tragedy of Yugoslavia after the end of the Cold War proved this undoubtedly.

1. 4 War For National Liberation Or A Civil War ?!

Hatreds among different national groups in the last period of the Kingdom elevated to its highest level. The government went on exile and left the country in a disastrous situation. The war in Yugoslavia started in 6 April 1941, with the bombardment of Belgrade, and by that decision of Axis Powers Yugoslavia was broken into pieces. Italy annexed Southern Slovenia and parts of Dalmatia and administered Montenegro. Albania was united with Kosovo and Western parts of Macedonia, under Italian occupation. Germany annexed northern Slovenia, Hungary took part of the Vojvodina, and to Bulgaria was given the rest of Macedonia and parts of Southern Serbia.⁴⁷ It was unimaginable, but in a way at least all the groups of the first Yugoslavia found themselves in those positions that they deemed for, all the time since the creation of the Yugoslav state.

After the invasion, the occupiers needed cooperation. Their first step was to find the quisling leaders. In Croatia they looked on cooperation with Macek, since he

⁴⁷ Harold Lydall, 1984, *Yugoslav Socialism, Theory & Practice*, Oxford University Press, New York, pp.55

refused, the only alternative left for them was Pavelich and his Ustasa movement with all that unpopularity it had during first Yugoslavia. They came to power and established the independent state of Croatia. This "Puppet State" would encompass also Bosnia- Herzegovina, which existed always as a problem between Serbs and Croats. When they came to power, Macek broadcasted a statement to the peoples on obeying the new authorities, but the truth was that he could not anticipate what Ustasa regime was about to do. ⁴⁸ Soon after they came to power, the Serbs were regarded as elements of political aggression against their Croatian State. Their plan was to kill a third, to expel a third to Serbia, and to convert the reminder to Catholicism. By these traumas and massacres the most affected was the poor peasantry of Bosnia.

In reaction to these acts in the Serb inhabited regions resistance groups among the Serbs named as Cetniks sprang up in district around Knin and Krajina and in the region of Bihac to its East. Cetniks were led by the same ideology of the Ustasa regime in Zagreb, which was designed in late 1942 when they held a Chetnik Congress and envisaged a Chetnik military dictatorship after the war, based on the total political dominance of the Serbs in a unitary Yugoslavia and the expulsion of all minorities.⁴⁹

Although the ethnic rivalry was more expressed between the Croats and the Serbs or better to be said , between Ustasas and Chetniks, interethnic conflicts showed

⁴⁸ Stevan K. Pavlowitch, 1988, *The Improbable Survivor, Yugoslavia and Its Problems 1918-1988*, Ohio State University Press, pp.10-15

⁴⁹ L. Kuchmar, 1987 *Draza Mihailovic and the Rise of the Chetnik Movement 1941-2*, Vol.2, London: Garland Publishing, pp.272-5; See for more in the book of Jozo Tomasevich, 1975, *The Chetniks: War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941-1945*; Stanford University Press. Stanford; Duncan Wilson, 1979, *Tito's Yugoslavia*, Cambridge University Press, pp.20-24

that all groups with the exception of the Slovenes fought against the Serbs, and "extreme nationalists on all sides, were able to indulge their wildest fantasies".⁵⁰

These national ideologies were to re-emerge once again in the late 1980's. Reappearing along with the old national myths and ideologies, they called not for the reconciliation but for the final settling of old scores.⁵¹ The framework of these ideologies was provided with the fantasy and the prominence of their culture while the other nations living in the area were viewed with skepticism and were seen as a permanent threat to the survival of their own nation or culture. This established a ground and opened a scene yet for another hatred among them.

Since Bosnia was the place that suffered most extensively of ethnic revenge, from 1941 in a town east of Bosnia, the first proletarian brigade was formed, commanded by a Spanish civil war veteran Koca Popovic, a Serb communist, known as a fervent communist. Although very small, this unit was a nascent of the future Partisan and mobile army, and it was able to recruit masses fed-up with massacres of Chetniks and Ustasas. The brigades were led by Tito who distinguished himself by his service in the Habsburg Army after 1914.⁵² His aim was to promote a common struggle against the invaders and to lay a basis for the revolution based on the Soviet model.

⁵⁰ Christopher Benett, 1995, *Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse, Causes, Course and Consequences*, Hurst & Company, London, cit. pp.47

⁵¹ James Gow, 1997, *The Triumph of the Lack of Will, International Diplomacy and the Yugoslav War*, Hurst & Company, London pp.12; Almond, op.cit, pp133-150; Jahja Sadowski, "Ethnic Conflict", *Foreign Policy*, no.111, Summer 1998, pp12-23; Mattei Dogan, "Nationalism in Europe: Decline in the West, Revival in the East", *Nationalism & Ethnic Politics*, vol.3 no.3, Autumn 1997,

⁵² Branislav Iliq, Vojislav Qirkoviq, 1979, *Kronologija e Veprimtarise Revolucionare te Josip Broz Titos*, (*The Chronology of the Revolutionary Acts of Josip Broz Tito*) Beograd, pp 2-10; Stevan K. Pavlowitch, *Tito, Yugoslavia's Great Dictator, A Reassessment*, Ohio State University Press, Columbus 1992, pp51

Albanians of Kosovo did not joined the communists in the beginning. Having united with Albania under Italian occupation, Albanians viewed the communist movement skeptically. Starting from 1943, they joined the brigades, and this was only after the promise from Yugoslav Communists who had previously advocated precisely the same arrangement and the position that the Albanians had under Italian occupation.⁵³

Concerning the issue of whether this was a civil war or war for liberation, it is still debatable. Some authors claim that it was combined, embracing the two elements. Some still write with emotions as the “Liberation War”, as *Djilas* interpreted as the “Partisan Heroism”⁵⁴ Nevertheless, the truth is that “Yugoslavs were slaughtered by other Yugoslavs more than by foreign soldiers.”⁵⁵ The reason is that, compared to other battlefronts, the fighting in Yugoslavia was small-scale, and territory of Yugoslavia was used as the place for resting the soldiers. The only time when the significant number of German troops was in Yugoslavia were during the initial invasion in 1941 and 1944. Germany relied in quisling forces to keep Yugoslavia under control, living German troops free for more important battlefronts, especially those in the Soviet Union.⁵⁶

At the end we are ready to pose a question of, why the unity is favored once again after all that slaughtering? This issue will be discussed thoroughly in the following parts of this work

⁵³ Branka Magas, 1993, *The Destruction of Yugoslavia, Tracing the Break - Up 1980-92*, Verso, p.7-12

⁵⁴ Aleksa Gjillas, 1991, *The Contested Country, Yugoslav Unity and Communist Revolution 1919-1953*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts: London pp.147.

⁵⁵ Pavlowitch, 1988, *The Improbable Survivor*, op.cit pp.15

⁵⁶ *ibid*, pp.10-15

CHAPTER II :THE SECOND YUGOSLAVIA AND THE DEVELOPMENTS UP TO THE BEGINNING OF ITS DISSOLUTION

2.1. Tito's Ideas on Federalism

As noted earlier, the Serb-Croat-Slovene Kingdom was a state that, despite its ethnic diversity, exercised intolerance and hegemony. The Kingdom was mainly Serb dominated and that inevitably would lead to the civil war in 1941. Its bloody collapse marked inter ethnic killing, satisfaction of peasant radicalism that resulted in a large scale atrocities of at least 2.2 million out of 18 million citizens.¹ It showed that it was not a vital state either for such a state would not end in a bloody civil war. These facts had to be taken into account by the Communists while contemplating whatever state form for the future state of Yugoslavia. The national question remained the most important issue facing the new Communist leadership of Yugoslavia. A big gap in economy, besides the national question, was the second of two issues that tested the vitality and the strength of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY). Taking into account the fact that the previous order was discredited and the Communists were the most dynamic element, Tito and his comrades remained the only viable force in Yugoslavia's post-War process of recreation.²

¹ Paul Mojzes, 1994, *Yugoslavian Inferno, Ethnoreligious Warfare in the Balkans*, Continuum, New York, pp.47; B. Kocavic, 1985, *Žrtve Drugog Svjetskog Rata u Jugoslaviji*, (*The Victims of The Second World War*), London, Nase Delo, pp.126 ; John Zametica, *The Yugoslav Conflict*, Adelphi Paper 270, International Institute of Strategic Studies , London, Brassey's 1992

They proclaimed and forged the new ideology , rightly named by *Djilas* (the Yugoslav dissident) , as a "progressive ideological make up " by trading national loyalties. That would made possible the recruitment of all nations to the Communist cause, including the non-Slavs (Albanians and Hungarians in the first place). ³ Besides this recruitment policy, it was only after 1943 that the partisans took the control over the large portions of Yugoslav territory. Of course, the decisive role was played, as elsewhere in Eastern Europe, by the Red Army .⁴

No doubt, Tito was the crucial figure in the very genesis of Yugoslavia's recreation including its future development up to the dissolution in 1992. Its first brigade was set up in 1943 in the Bihac area of Bosnia-Herzegovina . Not accidentally, Bosnia - Herzegovina was chosen as a place where the second Yugoslavia emerged from the ashes for there occurred the most ferocious inter ethnic - atrocities .⁵ From the outset, Tito proclaimed the national equality among Yugoslavs. Based on this, on November 1943, it was held the so-called "AVNOJ" meeting in which the federal principle of Communist Yugoslavia was declared and the territorial integrity affirmed. These decisions, later endorsed by the 1945 "AVNOJ" meeting, were considered as the best solution of the Yugoslav national question. The Kingdom of Yugoslavia was legally suspended on that occasion. ⁶

Besides its occupation and dismemberment during the WW II, Tito managed to preserve Yugoslavia's international subjectivity. Thus, although he changed its

² Michael Lees, 1990, *The Rape of Serbia, The British Role in Tito's Grab For Power 1943-1944*, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Publishers, pp.4-6

³ Djilas, *Contested Country*, cit, pp.152

⁴ Stevan K. Pavloeitch, *The Improbable Survivor*, op.cit. 13; Michael Lees, *The Rape of Serbia*, op.cit. pp.4

⁵ Stevan K. Pavlowitch, *Yugoslavia's Great Dictator*, op.cit.p.35

⁶ Branko Petranovic & Cedimir Strbac, 1997, *Istorija Socialisticke Jugoslavije*,(*The History of Socialist Yugoslavia*. First Book, Radnicka Stampa, Beograd, pp.23)
Prva Knjiga, Radnicka Stampa, Beograd,

political system he reached an agreement with the representatives of the exiled King of Yugoslavia, later to be known as "Tito-Subasic Agreement". In the agreement it was stated that Yugoslavia remains the same international person while its dual political system would be settled later through negotiations and agreement between the parties.⁷

New federal state of Yugoslavia aiming at different approach to the national question was created only when the republics of Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro were recognized. In the latter case there were oppositions to its formation for it was considered as a natural extension of Serbia. Yet, the CPY availed itself of the opportunity to set up the tiny republic of Montenegro. The same right was recognized to Macedonia which was established in what had been "South Serbia" and with its own Slav language more similar to Bulgarian evaluated to the status of an official language.⁸ The republican status was not granted to the Bosniacs until 1968. It never became a reality for the Albanians.

Albanians were convinced that the spirit of the Yugoslav Communists was totally opposed to that of former Royal Government.⁹ It was agreed that the Albanians should be able to chose their destiny with the right to self-determination. For this reason the Kosovar Albanians had fought the Nazis and the Fascists hoping that Kosovo would become one with motherland Albania. Tito considered the Albanian issue as a very sensitive one and believed that it should be solved within his

⁷ *ibid*, pp.27

⁸ Mirko Tepavac, "Tito's Yugoslavia". In *Yugoslavia's Ethnic Nightmare*, 1995, (ed. by) Jasminka Udovicki & James Ridgeway, Lawrence Hill Books, pp.59 ; James Gow, 1992, *Legitimacy and the Military, The Yugoslav Crisis*, St. Martin's Press New York, pp.9

⁹ Safete Juka, 1984, *Kosova the Albanians in Yugoslavia in Light of Historical Documents*, Waldon Press Inc. pp.136; Hannes Treter- Joseph Marko- Tomislav Boric, "Perspektivat e Statusit te ardhshem te Kosoves".(Perspectives of the Future Status of Kosova) *op.cit.* pp. 217-218; Baranka Magas, 1993, *The Destruction of Yugoslavia*, Verso, pp.34

projects of the Balkan Federation. The Federation foresaw an alliance between Albania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, a process nipped in the bud by Stalin.¹⁰

Tito, as a pragmatic as he was, had fears of the Serbian nationalism. His first experience was Royal Yugoslavia. In his path to retain firm grip on power, besides republics, he set up two autonomous provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina, both within the Republic of Serbia. It was not meant to solving the national question but, as argued by *Cernobrnja*, to serve as the most convenient vehicle to cut the Serbian size. This does not mean that Tito was anti-Serbian but rather a pro Yugoslav leader.¹¹ For Tito it was very important to build a power base in largely hostile Serbia that saw in Tito with skepticism due to his ethnic origin, half-Croat, half Slovene and had not only dethroned the Serbian Karadjordjevic dynasty in 1945 but had also Draza Mihajlovic tried and shot as a Nazi collaborator in 1946.

To oppose the Serbs, Tito espoused Yugoslav "unitarism", which both directly and indirectly favored the revival of Serb influence, especially in the Army, the police, the diplomatic service and the federal government in Belgrade, the capital of Serbia as well as of Yugoslavia. Federated though in its structure, the state remained centralist and was anything more unitary and centralist than it had been under King Alexander.¹² This form of federalism which Tito created in 1945 at first suited the Serbs because in essence the state remained centralist in this way and dominated both Kosovo and Vojvodina, wielded considerable power in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia as well as in Serbia and Montenegro. This

¹⁰ Noel Malkom, 1998, *Kosovo A Short History*, Macmillan, pp.319-320; Elisabeth Barker, 1980, *Macedonia Its Place in Balkan Power Politics*, Greenwood Press Publishers, pp.129

¹¹ Paul Shoup, "Titoism and the National Question in Yugoslavia: A Critical Reassessment". In *The Desintegration of Yugoslavia*, 1992, (ed. by) Martin van Den Heuvel and Jan G. Siccama, Yearbook of European Studies, Amsterdam- Atlanta, GA

arrangement actually strengthened the Serb hold over the country.¹³

Such an extended hand of the Serbs over the country was made possible through Alexander Rankovic, chief of the secret police, founded and promoted by Tito himself in 1943. Rankovic created a network of informers in all places and a vast archives of dossiers not only of suspected and enemies but also of loyal Party leaders. His fall from power in July of 1966, generally was viewed at the time as a defeat of Serbian bid to control the CPY and, though it, the whole country.¹⁴ The event itself paved the way for the 1974 decentralization of the country that brought in the type of federation more liberal that would not allow Serbia any more too much space for maneuver as in the past. This was the reason why the 1974 Constitution was criticized so much in Serbia after Tito's death in 1980.

Until his death, Tito had been a central political figure in Yugoslavia for he was an unquestioned arbiter. He would intervene wherever the system was threatened by internal conflicts.¹⁵ But, in his efforts to satisfy all, Tito risked to satisfy nobody, as proved after his death. Although the Communist Yugoslavia which emerged out of the WW II was a genuine attempt to reconcile the interests of all, the system of Government was intricate and complex and designed to be manifestly fair.. Hence a right conclusion by *Catherine Samary* who says that "federalism of Tito was not an artificial creature because had the CPY not won the legitimacy, the new government could not have been in power and survived several decades without

¹² Branimir Anzulovic, 1999, *Heavenly Serbia, From Myth to Genocide*, Hurst & Company, London, pp.95

¹³ Christopher Benett, op.cit. pp.55

¹⁴ Paul Shoup , 1968, *Communism and the Yugoslav National Question*, New York; Columbia University Press. pp.115-116; Dennisow Russinow, 1997, *The Yugoslav Experiment, 1948-1974*, London, C. Hurst, Co. pp.187

¹⁵ Mark Almond, op.cit.159; Paul Shoup op.cit.pp.58

major explosions, given all the experienced traumas of the war left behind".¹⁶

2. 2. Myths On Which Former Yugoslavia Was Based

While the WWI was still going on, the CPY represented the only party among Yugoslavs offering a common solution for all of them through propagating an entirely new ideology of brotherhood and unity among its various nations. Such an ideology would later serve to mobilize popular masses and gather a very much of support among Yugoslavia's nations. That ideology was personified by Marshall Tito.

The war had had too many victims among Yugoslavs and ethnic hatred exacerbated to unimaginable proportions. The latter came to be the hardest and most cumbersome task facing Tito's ideology. To bridge this ethnic hatred, especially between the Serbs and Croats, posed a very serious challenge. As in other Communist countries, instead of trying to mitigate real ethnic problems, Tito and his comrades embarked on a policy of searching for enemy outside, mainly within the various social strata. All ethnic violence was put at the doors of the *Ustashe* regime in Zagreb and at the others puppet regimes' doors in Belgrade and elsewhere in Yugoslavia. They were considered as a product of international bourgeoisie. The struggle and the rebuilding of Communist Yugoslavia were the substitutes for the real causes of the ethnic violence and its long-term consequences.¹⁷

Such an approach was made clear by Tito in his speech in 1994 whereby he had

¹⁶ Catherine Samary, *Yugoslavia Desintegration*, cit.pp.58

declared that the war was waged for the sake of settling old scores with the national burgesses. In the speech, he had paid too much attention to the brotherhood and unity among Yugoslav people considering the equality and unity among them as a "condictio sine qua non" for his new order and for the transformation of the old hegemony of the Serbs into a new spirit of tolerance. Along these lines, the brotherhood and unity was used as a key term propagated by the CPY. It was meant to stand for the equality and mutual respect among Yugoslav peoples where they would fight, work and live together with equal rights and duties, regardless of nationality, race or religion. This represented one of ways the CPY tried to bridge the ethnic differences and overcome any fear from hegemonic tendencies.¹⁸ Although today this might be seen as an object of scorn, it was not an empty demagoguery in a country where hundreds and thousands lost their lives due to ethnic violence .¹⁹

The equality of Yugoslav nations was considered the important issue after the War. For this reason, it was even sanctioned in Art. 21 of the 1946 Constitution of Yugoslavia.²⁰ Wartime slogan "brotherhood and unity" symbolized the nations of Yugoslavia comprising not only the equality but as well the Yugoslav integration and the creation of a common Yugoslav consciousness which was meant to be a supranational identity instead of national.²¹ This was the way foreseen for settling the national question. The CPY believed that it would gradually lead to a complete

¹⁷ Tito's speech, published on *Proleter*, December 1942

¹⁸ George Schopflin, "Nationhood, Communism and State Legitimation, *Nations and Nationalism* ", vol.1, part1, March 1995; *Petranovic & Strbac*, op.cit. pp.26

¹⁹ Tepavac, op.cit, pp.59

²⁰ FNRJ Ustav, 1946

²¹ Vesna V. Godina, "The Outbreak of Nationalism on Former Yugoslav Territory: A Historical Perspective on the Problem of Supranational Identity", *Nations and Nationalism*, vol.4, part3, July 1988, pp.409-422

disappearance of national consciousness .²²

The above path had been modeled upon the Soviet Union which was considered as a country that had solved the national question ideally. Russia served as a reference point, although in the case of Yugoslavia the Slav unity and solidarity weighted equally. The Slav cause was meant to transcend individual nationalities. This would be an ideal of creating a nation state, composed of Yugoslavs. Yet, the Communists faced the same problem the Italians did at the time of Italy's unification. Italian Conte *Massimo d' Azeglio* , considered in his time that : “ We have made Italy, now we have to make the Italians instead of Sicilians, Sardinians ...”.²³ So, the Yugoslav Communists had to fight for the “Yugoslavs” as well. ²⁴

Such manner of nation-building was deemed achievable through the Communist policy of recruitment of new cadres from within the all constituent republics more or less proportionally, as well as through the recruitment of other “neglected strata” of society and other “unrecognized ethnic groups” such as Muslims and Albanians.²⁵ In this way, other potential ideological or national approaches were neutralized and cleansed from the CPY, thus making the new Communist federation more tightened and centralized.²⁶

In practice, the very notion of “Yugoslavism” will remain as a term implying the

²² Speech of the Secretary General KPJ Josip Broz Tito held in establishment of the Kongres KP Srbije (8-12 Maj 1945).After the liberation of the country ,Tito promoted Yugoslavism and insisted that the borders of republics should not divide but unite the peoples of Yugoslavia.

²³ The words were spoken at the time of unification of Italy in 1861.

²⁴ Dobrica Cosic, “Uslovi Demokratske Buducnosti”, (Tasks of the Democratic Future), Knjizevne Novine,15 December,pp.78-9,

²⁵ J.F.Brown,op.cit. pp.61-63

²⁶ Paul Shoup,1968,*Communism and the Yugoslav National Question*,New York,Columbia University Press, pp.115-16

state itself but not its constituent nations, that is, the CPY would not achieve the cleansing of national identities that would exist in parallel with Yugoslav state.²⁷ Such an approach towards Yugoslavism had an impact on interethnic relations, especially in Bosnia-Herzegovina. There, interethnic marriages were very common phenomena although it was composed of Serbs, Croats and Muslims. Most of them, during the time, identified themselves as “Yugoslavs”. In the 1953 census, a huge percentage of the population in Yugoslavia would declare themselves as “Yugoslavs”.²⁸

Besides the political cadres recruited through the CPY, the Communists had yet another duty to cultivating a new spirit of Yugoslavism by organizing voluntarily the youths into various working brigades and excursions. The new generations had a sense of belonging to a stable European country, largely because of its growing national prestige, and a feeling was that the war was a phenomenon of the past and will never happen again. This was helped by the new way of building the Socialism inaugurated through the self-management system designed to curb the power of bureaucracy, and in this regard favoring the autonomy and sovereignty of the republics. It was believed that, among others, the working class would create the unified Yugoslav consciousness.²⁹

Yugoslavia had an image abroad and with this image outside the people would identify themselves in a proud way. But this was in fact Titos's merit and his

²⁷ J.B.Tito 1940/1946. “ The Previous Works and the Tasks of the Party”. Speech Delivered at the Fifth Conference of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia,Zagreb,October 1940. Published in *Communist*, no.1,October 1946; *Vesna V.Godina* op.cit. pp.409-422

²⁸ Interview, Sarajevo, June 1980, cited in Sabrina Petra Ramet,1992, *Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia* (1962-1991)second edition, Indiana University Press: Bloomington and Indianapolis

²⁹ Nenad D. Popovic, 1968, *Yugoslavia the New Class In Crisis*, Syracuse University Press pp.61-82, see for more, A.Z.Rubenstein,1970,*Yugoslavia and the Nonaligned World* , Princeton University Press: Princeton, pp.5-15

charisma that contributed to Yugoslavia's favorable image abroad and inside the country. The main reason for this was Tito's way pursued after the break up with Stalin. Then, he had chosen a Non-Aligned path and inside he had already built a new system of building the Socialism. Non-Aligned Movement enabled Tito to have a huge financial support from international community, especially from the Western countries. This support came as a result of Western fears that Tito may turn, due to Stalin's pressure, towards the Soviet Union again. In this way, Tito and his Yugoslavia served at least as a "buffer zone" between East and West.³⁰

All these factor had an impact on Yugoslavia's Socialism that gave to it a "human face" compared to other Socialist countries. Tito managed to keep together the country not only ideologically but as well though the Yugoslav Army (JNA) in which he invested so much.³¹ After Tito's death in 1980, Yugoslavs started to live more and more with distorted interpretations of the past, wedded empty rhetoric of Titoism and its twin pillars of Self-Management and Non-Aligned Movement became an obsolete issue. The same case was with the brotherhood and unity myths in a society where the Communists were losing their impact over its structures day but day. The CPY was gradually becoming powerless to influence its own destiny and with it the destiny of the entire country of Yugoslavia.³² With the CPY's role vanishing, other pillars and myths (Brotherhood and Unity among Yugoslavs, Self-Management and the Non-Allied Movement) faded away altogether.

³⁰ David Owen, 1995, *Balkan Odyssey*, Indigo, pp.11, Sekulic op.cit.pp.165-179

³¹ Stoyan Pribichevic, "Tito at 80: An Uncomplicated Marxist", *New York Times*, 25 may 1972; Jim Seroka and Radoslav Smiljkovic, 1986, *Political Organs in Socialist Yugoslavia*, Duke U.P, Durham, pp.55-6, 60

³² Norman Cigar, *Genocide in Bosnia, The Policy of "Ethnic Cleansing"* Texas A&M, University Press College Station 1995, pp.21

2.3. Political and Constitutional Structure of the Second Yugoslavia

After the end of the WW II, there were held the elections in Yugoslavia. They brought to power the Communists. In the first phase of its development, the CPY was guided by the Soviet-type of ideology. It meant that the entire social and political system would have to be based on the Marxist ideology and its dogmas.

Although federal in its form, the structure of the Yugoslav state would be from its inception a centralist one.³³ Political power, was based on the Soviet model, that is, it was concentrated in the highly centralized CPY and its highest executive organ was Politburo whose members were chosen by the Party's General Secretary Marshal Tito.³⁴

In this way, weak and still surviving elements of the post war civil society were destroyed or engulfed by the party state. Party would play central role and come to be regarded as the state, and the ideology that ran the state together with the terror induced fear and crippled any potentially significant political opposition to the regime. There were all the elements working towards "homogenization" and strengthening of the "vertical links". This was made possible as well due to the Party's monopoly that rejected any political pluralism. As with other Communist dictatorship, in Yugoslavia too Marxist ideology considered the political parties as a "superstructure of the Capitalist social and economic order, whose hidden purpose was to perpetuate that order". The Communist ideology maintained that a monopoly of power by a communist party is a prerequisite for the revolutionary

³³ Nenad, D, Popovic, op.cit. pp. 61-82

transformation of society.³⁵

In that spirit was adopted the first Constitution of Yugoslavia in January of 1946. That constitution legitimized the power base of the CPY. It limited the sovereignty of the Yugoslav republics by foreseeing that certain right would belong only to the Federated Yugoslavia. The 1946 Constitution marked the new beginning in a revived Yugoslavia, renamed as the “Federal Peoples Republic of Yugoslavia”.³⁶ It was the first one to mark the end of the Serbian hegemony over Yugoslavia after twenty years.

Many have argued that the Constitution was a close copy of Stalin’s 1936 Constitution for it reflected Lenin’s approach to national question in the 1920s and the Commitment made by the CPY in 1928 that it would replace the Kingdom’s unitary state with a federal order.³⁷

Yet, if we compare the Soviet Constitution of 1936 with that of Yugoslavia’s a decade later, a distinction would be very big for the reason that Soviet Constitution granted to its nationalities not only the right to secede but also the independent armed forces. The issue of self-determination had as well been differently crafted as compared to the Soviet Union. Thus, in Art. 1 of the 1946 Constitution of Yugoslavia, there was stated that : “ Yugoslavia is a community of equal peoples that on the basis of self-determination, including the right of secession, have expressed their will to live together in a federal state”. It was considered that the

³⁴ *ibid* , pp. 61-82

³⁵ Djillas *op.cit*, pp.152, Zoltan D. Barany, *op.cit*. pp.116

³⁶ FNRJ, Ustav 1946

³⁷ S.Markovic, 1923, Nacionalno Pitanje u Svetlosti Marksizma, (National Question in the Light of Marxism), Belgrade,

right to self-determination has been exercised once and for all .³⁸

After the break up with the Soviet Union, there started the new manner of transformation of the Yugoslav society. It conditioned the changes in Yugoslavia's constitutional structure. In line with this there was adopted a new constitutional law in 1953 with the aim of abandoning the Soviet model and creating a new and "original constitution".³⁹ Although the intention of this law had been the transformation of the society, on the issue of self-determination it remained more or less silent compared to the previous constitution. The transformation of the CPY into the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (The LCY) was meant to further decentralize the country. This, together with the introduction of the self-management system in economy, proved to be the turning points toward the pretty much original way of Yugoslav Socialism. That was the initial phase of the "Yugoslav experiment" and would be the main feature of Yugoslav Socialism. The transformation of this type had an impact , even before the 1963 Constitution was adopted, in a sense that it initialed a new type of political coalition to be forged between business leaders as well as liberal-minded people who were willing to see through the reshaping of decision making and shift in the locus of power away from the Party towards the citizens.⁴⁰ Anyway, the Communist Party still remained the main force in conducting the state affairs and liberal way as provided for will remain an unfeasible in practice. That way of liberal ascendancy in Yugoslav thinking characterized only the years after 1970.

³⁸ Paul Shoup op.cit.pp.118; In a difference from the Yugoslav constitution of 1946, the Soviet constitution guaranteed to its nationalities not only the right to secede, but also an independent foreign policy and armed forces.

³⁹ Jovan Djordjevic, 1978, *Ustavno Pravo*, Belgarde,pp.5-20

This quasi-liberal period started with the Constitutional Amendments of 1971. They paved the way for the 1974 Constitution. Since it was a time of more or less liberal thought in Yugoslavia, the centralist tendencies within the Serbian elite were identified with Great Serbian aspirations, resulting in the formation of a stable anti-Serbian coalition.⁴¹ It was a time when a part of Yugoslav elite saw a breath of liberalism as an opportunity to dismantle the dictatorial superstructure altogether, openly advocating installation of a two party system in Yugoslavia but still committed to Socialism.

As a result of these liberal forces and the new claims for the change in Yugoslav society, there was adopted the 1974 Constitution. The Constitution marked the corner stone in Yugoslavia's confederation. It created the semi confederation until its disintegration in 1992 by providing the devolution of power in republics and autonomous provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina. It channeled the various conflicting aspirations for more autonomy from the center that would later lead to Yugoslavia's bloody collapse.

Compared with previous constitutions of 1946, 1953 and 1963, the 1974 Constitution represents a radical change since the previous ones did not foresee any unanimous consent of the federal units regarding the cardinal issues of Yugoslavia's political and state system altogether (changing of the Constitution, issue of borders, monetary and foreign policy, etc.).⁴² Even the autonomous provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina had the right to veto the constitutional

⁴⁰ Vladimir Goati, The Challenge of Post-Communism. In *The Tragedy of Yugoslavia, The Failure of Democratic Transformation* 1992 (ed. by) Jim Seroka and Vukasin Pavlovic, M.E Sharpe, Inc. pp.3-13

⁴¹ Magas, op.cit, pp.35-39, Bruce McFarlane, 1988, *Yugoslavia, Politics, Economics and Society*, Pinter Publishers : London and New York pp.55-65

changes that would be deemed by them as detrimental to their interests. This does not mean that the LCY would not be still the main actor in directing Yugoslavia's affairs. Instead, it retained much the same monopoly in running the daily affairs of the State of Yugoslavia, but a liberal spirit ushered in by the 1974 Constitution was very much noticeable even to the foreigners,⁴² especially when compared to the former Socialist countries of the time.

2.4. The Decentralization As A Substitute For the Political Democratization Of The Country

As noted earlier, even before the 1974 Constitution there were voices heard within the Yugoslav republics asking for more liberalization. These voices of dissatisfaction and vocal grievances came from some of the republics. The problems asked for immediate response and solution. In response to the pressures the LCY decided to devolve administrative, economic and some political powers in accommodation to the diverse reality and mixture of nations and cultures. It was done as well to accommodate the new generation that was more liberal and that asked for reforms directed against, as they called it, "old type of development model".⁴³ This devolution was sanctioned with the 1974 Constitution that brought about changes within the legal, economic and political system. The way of conducting the State affairs was changed from its previous vertical line into a horizontal one whereby the centralism had been replaced with wide decentralization of the State structures.

Such a process had been a necessity since further centralization would have meant

⁴² Vojislav Kostunica, "The Constitution and The Federal States", In *Fractured Federalism* 1988,

the loss of vital advantage offered both by the self-management model in general and by the Yugoslav system, the breaking down and the dispersion of conflicts of interests.⁴⁴ With this constitution, there were carefully destroyed the very foundations of the “Yugoslav political community” since there was no valid way to expressing the affiliation to Yugoslavia as the State of citizens.

The 1974 Constitution had been designed to prevent any of Yugoslav peoples from dominating the Federation by dispensing with the trappings of a Confederation with eight actors of the new balance of power and, second, to prevent any individual from acquiring as much power as Tito himself had had by keeping for himself the life-time post of the head of the State and the control over the Armed Forces. This was made possible through the establishment of the one-year Collective Presidency organ that would rule on the rotation principle after the death of Tito. The Constitution has been considered as a result of a new spirit that emerged at the time. The new Federation was not, as one Serbian scholar wrote, a “matter of accident but an expression of one ideology or one intellectual sympathy, It is a product of history, of objective necessity and political wisdom”.⁴⁵

Guided by the idea that no process of domination would be allowed, it has been provided that all changes to the Constitution require a common consent of the federal units while Serbia was forced into a “unique” position within the new balance of power. The Constitution foresaw that the autonomous provinces could

(ed.by) Dennison Rusinow , The Wilson Center Press, Washington DC, pp.78-93

⁴³ Vladimir Goati, op.cit. pp3-22; Almond op. cit. Pp.150-171

⁴⁴ Ivan Simonovic, “Socialism, Federalism, and Ethnic Identity”. In *Yugoslavia a Fractured Federalism*, 1988, (ed, by Rusinow), op.cit. pp. 41-58; Slavko Radosevic, “The Collapse of Yugoslavia – Between Chance and Necessity”. In *Yugoslavia and After, A Study in Fragmentation, Despair and Rebirth*, 1996, (eds. by) David A. Dyker and Ivan Vejvoda, Longman pp.75

⁴⁵ Jovan Djordjevic, “Deset Parvila Federacije”, (Ten Pillars of the Federation) *Naprijed*, January 1978,

change their constitutions without the interference of the Republic of Serbia.⁴⁶ This was a new manner of conducting the daily state affairs that did not fit at all to the Serbs for it stopped the Belgrade's policy of centralist management of the State and the policy of assimilation or denationalization towards the Macedonian and Muslim Slavs and certain minorities (notably the Albanians)⁴⁷. Now, it became apparent that the effective power resting at the level of the republics was so strong that the parts were able to dictate the rules to the whole and the federal units could block any of the possibility for the central authorities based on the party basis.

Such a federated arrangement made Yugoslavia different from all other Socialist federations of the time.⁴⁸ Since the foreign affairs, defense and essential economic matters remained the prerogative of the federal center and needed the consensus among the federal units, every republic and the autonomous provinces had equal rights and access to the positions of power. Thus, the nation would become the political category and centralist power was simply transferred from the federal authority to the republics.

At the time, the 1974 Constitution had been considered as perfect solution and as the only "modus vivendi" for the problems facing Yugoslav State. It is against this background that the Communist leaders nourished hopes and illusions that they had solved all political, social and national problems and that they managed to create a "heaven of peace" in Europe at a time when ETA, IRA, Red Brigades etc.,

⁴⁶ Mehmet Kraja, 1995, *Vitet e Humbura. (The Lost Years)* Tirane pp.74; J.F.Brown, op.cit pp.150-151; Tim Judah, 1997 *The Serbs, History, Myth and the Destruction of Yugoslavia*, Yale University Press, pp.159-153

⁴⁷ Paul Shoup, "Titoism and The National Question in Yugoslavia: a Reassessment" et.al Willem Verneer, "Albanians and Serbs in Yugoslavia". In *The Desintegration of Yugoslavia*, 1992, (ed. by) Martin van Den Heuvel and Jan G. Siccama

⁴⁸ Kostunica, op.cit. pp.80

were in full swing.⁴⁹

But, the Constitution was a legal text characterized by confused principles and overlapping rights. Potential conflict has been caused by a mere fact of non-designating precisely who were the subjects of self-determination in Yugoslavia. If looked at closely, its first article said that “Yugoslavia is a federal state having the form of a state community, of voluntarily unified nations and their Socialist Republics and Socialist Autonomous Provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo”. This further implied that this right had been exercised once and for all through the nation’s identification with one federal state. That resembled very much the 1946 Constitution.⁵⁰ It provided that, indirectly, the only states to be formed from Yugoslavia would be republics and not its constituent nations irrespective of the place where they lived and, what is more important, it did not foresee any legal or other mechanism for the resolution of conflicts.⁵¹

This hindrance to Yugoslavia’s development had earlier been foreseen by Edward Kardelj, one of the closest Tito’s allies. He stated as far back as 1957 that:” Yugoslavia is a historically temporary creation. The world is an integration process... The peoples will be able to go and join new associations and integration... In that sense , the Slovenes will understandably be with Italian and Austrians and the Serbs with the Bulgarian or with other historically close peoples...”⁵²

⁴⁹ Ivan Vejvoda, Yugoslavia 1945-1991, “From Decentralisation without Democracy to Dissolution”. In *Yugoslavia and After, 1996*, (ed. by Dyker, Vejvoda op.cit pp. 14

⁵⁰ Antonio Cassese, 1995, *Self-Determination of Peoples and the Recent Break-Up, A Legal Reappraisal*. Cambridge University Press, pp.140-141

⁵¹ *ibid* pp.140-142

With this constitution, Yugoslavia as a state would not function de facto. Each republic began to pursue its national development strategy with predictable results, often at expense of the rest of the Federation. Within a few years of Tito's death in 1980, each republic and autonomous province had become "a state within a state". The center no longer held. Gaps between the nations began widening uncontrollably. Beneath surface the ground was turbulent.⁵³ If we obey Dante's famous saying that the "road to hell is paved with good intentions", this proved to be a key factor in the pattern of degeneration, fragmentation and entering the inferno and suffering loss. Tito and other Communist leaders were still functioning under the logic of "soft totalitarianism". They continued to make all the key decisions and that is the reason why this period was considered a period of "decentralization without liberalization". The differences and not common values emerged gradually and legitimized the new adverse balance of forces as between old enemies.⁵⁴ Anyway while Tito was still alive, he was the supreme leader and was the guarantor of the unity of the country. It was not the system that functioned, but Tito himself.

If we analyze the 1974 system in Yugoslavia we could notice that the uncertainty had been introduced into the lives of citizens by the recurrent changes of rules in political, social and economic spheres during that period (1974-1980). There were no real democratic mechanisms to accommodate the various needs and settle the problems among Yugoslavs. The four successive constitutions within a span of less

⁵² Dobrica Cosic, "Uslovi Demokratske Buducnosti", (Conditions For The Future Democracy) *Knjizevne Novine*, 15 December, 1987 pp.7-8

⁵³ Tepavac, op. cit. pp.67

⁵⁴ Lidija R. Basta-Posavec, *Federalizam Bez demokratije, Politicka Prava Bez Gradjanina- Poruke Raspada Jugoslavije za Evropu.* ,(Federalism Without Democracy, Politics of Law Without Citizens-Message of the Dissolution of Yugoslavia for the Europe). In *Evropa I Rasklad Jugoslavije*, (*Europe and Dissolution of Yugoslavia*), 1995, (ed. by) Radmila Nakarada, Institut Za Evropske Studije, Beograd (Institution for European Studies), Beograd, pp. 129-35

than thirty years, the constant changes of legislations, created a situation with no legal security for citizens and wider for the society.

2.5. Nationalism In Former Yugoslavia

Despite all national and religious differences, the LCY was a driving and unifying force among Yugoslavs. While Tito was still alive there were no serious national problems for they were kept under the “ice box”.⁵⁵

The first Yugoslavia had been characterized by the Serb hegemony, a fact that remained much the same in the second one. The latter favored the centralism and Yugoslavism, tenets that were considered by other Yugoslav nations (mainly by Croats), as Serb hegemony. On the other side the Serb did not see it that way. Thus, *Dobrica Cosic*, one of the most prominent Communist Serb writer and the future president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (1992-93), stated in 1961 that development of common Yugoslav culture was hindered by the Federal Republics and their bureaucracies. This statement shows the hidden Serb claims and tendencies for hegemony over the other Yugoslav nations.⁵⁶

By considering the centralism and Yugoslavism as their tool for the realization of their aims, the number of Serbs and Montenegrins in the Party in the late 1960s grew up disproportionately to their respective populations. Since the Party was the power base, the Serbs and Montenegrin formed the most influential Communist

⁵⁵ At the Time, Cosic attacked the dangers of non-Serbian ethnic and regional nationalism in polemics with Slovenian communist intellectuals. This polemic was cited in “Jugoslovenstvo kao Srpski Nacionalizam”, (Yugoslavism as a Serb Nationalism), *Vreme*, vol.2, no.41 (August 5, 1991), p.21,

elite in Yugoslavia. This is the reason why in the period after 1945 up to 1966, the “unitarism” came to be under increasingly strong attack from most of Yugoslavia’s non Serbs. In Tito’s Yugoslavia as well the Serb-Croat relations remained frustrated in the same way as earlier. This is the reason why the system remained bipolar when it comes to the national question so that Serbia and Croatia remained still the major actor in the system.

It was a period when the confrontation between the new economic and scientific elite and the old politically and military elite reactivated all rivalries between different national communities and started with the “Croatian Spring”. That began in late 1960s and early 1970s as a cultural movement and was led by many of Croatia’s most distinguished intellectuals who were motivated by the alleged fact that the Croats risked losing their separate national identity within unitary Yugoslav state. As the movement became more militant, it also began to take an anti-Serb character .⁵⁷ The student leaders joined that movement by asking that students have say in Croatia’s affairs as well.

Tito was aware of the seriousness of the problem. For that he decided to intervene so that the “Croatian Spring” would end in a series of arrests, the banning of certain nationalist publications, the close of the “Matica Hrvatska” (well known nationalist cultural club) and the purge of the Croatian society from the “undesirable elements” and the replacement of those elements with reliable Party

⁵⁶ Reneo Lukic & Alen Lynch ,1996, *Europe From the Balkans to the Urals, The Disintegration of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union*, SIPRI, pp.57-97; Janusz Bugajski,1992, *Nations in Turmoil, Conflict and Cooperation in Eastern Europe*, Wesview Press pp. 90-105

⁵⁷ Judah op.cit. pp.145-146

cadres, mostly of Serbian and Montenegrin ethnic background .⁵⁸ One of important long-term effect of Tito's purge in Croatia was that it deepened the gap of mistrust between the majority Croat population and the Serb minority living there. There should be no doubt about Tito's sincere motive, that is, he did not undertake these purges on anti-Croat basis. He knew that the other way around would have meant causing other problems much more serious than the existing ones. To counteract these actions, after his visit to Rumania in 1971, Tito gathered his comrades and said: If you saw what I see for the future in Yugoslavia, It would scare you all".⁵⁹ This was a prelude to the purges in Serbia against the so-called liberal stream within the LCY. These events paved the way for other, mostly positive, undertakings in Kosovo by Tito and his comrades.

Compared with other nation in Yugoslavia, the Albanians had a very different position. During the twenty years of Communist rule, Tito made little attempt to integrate Albanians into Yugoslav society. They were left at the mercy of the state security apparatus and the secret police, which were dominated by the Serbs. This meant that the Albanians had very much a second class position.⁶⁰ During this time, they were not able to organize a substantial national movement. Up to the 1960s they had a generally anti-Communist orientation, and were predominantly linked to émigré organizations like "*Balli Kombetar*" ("National Front") and "*Legaliteti*" (The Royalist Supporters of King Zogu).⁶¹ But with the fall of Alexander Rankovic (1996), the Tito's hard-line police chief, policy towards

⁵⁸ Sabrina Ramet, 1992, *Balkan Babel, Politics, Culture, and Religion in Yugoslavia*, Wesview Press

⁵⁹ Benett op.cit. pp. 66

⁶⁰ Malcolm, 1998, *Kosovo A Short History*, op.cit pp.66

⁶¹ Shkelzen Maliqi, Non-Violent Resistance of Albanians. In *Conflict or Dialogue: Serbian – Albanian Relations and Integration of the Balkans*, 1990, Subotica: Open University-European Civic Centre for Conflict Resolution ; Knocking on Europe's Conscience- *Kosovo: Evidence and Documents* ,1992, (Prishtina : CDHRF)

Kosovo changed. It was a part of the overall liberal trends of the time. They were legalized as well by the constitutional changes made after the fall of Rankovic leading to the 1974 Constitution. Yet, the Albanian nationalist movement remained weak and diffusive up to 1981.

Poor living conditions, repression and the second class position of the Albanians led to the street demonstrations in the capital of Kosovo, Pristina, in 1968. They were in a way a response to the conclusion of the discussions on republican status for Kosovo. In fact, the call for republic had already been made, at least rhetorically, and by implication, when the senior Communist Mehmet Hoxha asked in April 1968: "Why do 370.000 Montenegrins have their republic, while 1.2 million Albanians do not even have total autonomy..."⁶² The police reacted forcefully, and one demonstrator was killed. In the following month forty-four people were given prison sentence.

Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina as well had their own problems. In most of the cases they were denied the fact about whether they were nations or not. In Macedonia's case, the Slav Macedonians had been recognized as a nation as far back as in 1946, still they insisted their language and descent be given a different status from the other Slavic neighbors. In the case of the Muslim, on the other hand, regional and cultural heritage was accepted as a sufficient basis for national identity, despite the fact that Bosnia -Herzegovina did not fulfill the narrow interpretation of the concept of the nation, which would include only peoples of the same race, religion, language and culture.⁶³ At the end, the Muslims of Bosnia-

⁶² Malcolm, op.cit. pp. 325

⁶³ Raju G. C. Thomas, History, religion and National Identity. In *The South Slav Conflict ,History, Religion, Ethnicity and Nationalism* ,1996, (ed. by) Raju G. C. Thomas & Richard Farkas, Garland

Herzegovina were recognized as an ethnic group in 1961 and in the fourth congress of the Bosnia – Herzegovina's Communists, they were assured of their right to self-determination. From strategic point of view, Tito recognized the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina for Yugoslav gains in the Middle East and North Africa. By supporting the Bosnian Muslim campaign for national status, Tito had in his hands an asset for the Yugoslav influence among Muslim countries in the above areas.

In Slovenia there were few national problem, as it had been the case with the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. This was made possible by the mere fact that it was ethnically homogenous, had a high level of economic development and developed civil society. Slovenia received first "internal foreigners" only after the Oil Shock" in 1973. This crisis forced the internal migration within Yugoslavia because impoverished Serbs, Muslims and the Albanians from Kosovo found employment in the rich Slovenia at the time, the arrival of non- Slovenes was perceived as a threat to their cultural independence and public opinion showed that 1970 nationalism waves in Yugoslavia were more intense in Slovenia than elsewhere .⁶⁴

To sum this up, it could be said that Tito years were generally as years of ascendance, prosperity and repeatability for Yugoslavia, and the national question except for a few isolated instance, did not raise its ugly head.⁶⁵ Yet, it should be admitted that the outside pressure had a great effect on this Yugoslav solidarity. After the Prague events of 1968, it became especially obvious that the Soviet threat

Publishing,Inc. For an interpretation of the Bosnian Muslim Identity,See Ivo Banac, *The National Question in Yugoslavia* op. cit pp. 359-377; Noel Malcolm, *Bosnia, A Short History*.

⁶⁴ Ljubljana University, Research Institute of the Faculty of Sociology, Political Science and Journalism, A Survey Research on the Class Composition of the Contemporay Yugoslav Societes, Ljubljana, May,1988

⁶⁵ Magas op.cit.79-83; Almond op.cit 150-170

was imminent. Hence, the Yugoslavs would sacrifice their internal quarrel very easily for the benefit of common prosperity and stability of the region as a whole.

CHAPTER III : BEGINNING OF THE DISSOLUTION

3.1. Inherent Causes (Hidden Nationalisms)

Even during Tito's reign, the national question was the most important one. Still the CPY and its elite believed that this problem in the Yugoslav federation did not exist for the alleged reason that it had been solved properly. They really believed in the Yugoslav Federation, that even on the eve of the revival of nationalism, Vladimir Bakaric, the president of the Central Committee of the League of Communist of Croatia, declared in one interview that " the national question plays very small role among ordinary people, that youth are not very interested on it, and that the nationalism as a mass phenomenon does not exist and has its place among bureaucrats and the intelligence ".¹ For the CPY, the devolution of power in the Constitution of 1974 was considered the best achievement of the Yugoslav system, thus equalizing the voices for any injustice engaged with national question. This new approach would yield still unsatisfactory results. As soon the balance of power within the country shifted towards the republics, it become possible for the opposition to manifest itself, and to rise the voices of unssatisfaction.²

With the introduction of the constitution of 1974, the republics had a role of the center of gravitation and with the new consensus rule, it was meant that any change in the constitution and therefore any recasting of the federation would be a long and complicated process. These rules prevented the federation from being re-

¹ Borba, 6 March 1966

² Pavkovic, 1997, *The Fragmentation of Yugoslavia*, op.cit. pp.75-80

legitimized through the federal elections, thus, the republics gained a new role. In each case they were identified with the majority nation. This was the first step towards the new nationalism that resulted in a "constitutional nationalism" and later on completed the process of "ethnification" of communist policies that had started during the years of 1970's.³ In this way nationalism that has been preserved in the "ice box" during Tito's time touched fingers with the national politics that had been developing throughout the centrifugal evolution of the party-state, by the late 1980 and early 1990, that had reemerged with the "thaw" of collapsing communism. And, as the Yugoslav crises worsened the phenomenon of "nationalist transfer" gradually spread to all communities and republics and later it caused the tragic dissolution developments.

This hidden nationalism, that suddenly manifested itself was produced within the very structure of the Yugoslav system. This system prevented any frank discussions on the national question, by suppressing the national feelings and by promoting them, at the same time, into a forbidden and valuable agendas.⁴ The CPY tried to solve it through doctrine of brotherhood and unity, which became a slogan, fulfilling the ironic destiny, that started to be exploited after the death of Tito. This communist ideology did not anticipate the way of political modernism. Instead, they used ideological dogmas and appealed for the unification that comprehended ideological and political unification without taking into consideration all the great differences between nations in terms of political and cultural

³ R.Hayden, "Constitutional Nationalism in the Former Yugoslav Republics", *Slavic Review*, vol.51, 1992, pp.654-73; Lidija R. Basta. op. cit. pp.133-34

⁴ Vladimir Goati, 1992, *The Tragedy of Yugoslavia*, (ed by) Seroka and Pavlovic, op.cit.3-12; Paul Shoup, 1992, *The Disintegration of Yugoslavia*, op.cit. pp.61

traditions, level of economic developments, patterns of social organization and sheer size.⁵

On the other hand, the Communist Federation of Yugoslavia could not have been sufficient to satisfy the demands for greater autonomy. It was this the reason that were the demonstrations of March and April of 1981 were organized in Kosovo. The demonstrators claimed for Kosova full republican status (the Republic of Kosovo), convinced that the Albanians had already reached the point of being the factor in Yugoslavia due to the "qualitative changes" in the 1974 Constitution.⁶ But once again and guided by the communist ideology, without taking into consideration and without making any concession to the demonstrators, the 1981 revolt was suppressed by the brutal force. The Kosovo issue and the Albanian question were sidelined by the Communist elite. In this case, as with the others, there was decided in a very beurocratic way, without leaving any space for a dialogue inside society. This form of leading by the Communists made it possible the further development of Albanian nationalism from "anti-national" towards "national" and to end-up in "nationalistic" as the way to searching for the "new identity".⁷ These were mistakes of the system and of the Communist ideology, with their political dominance in political sphere throughout the post-War period in

⁵ Zagorka Golubovic, 1995, "Pojava Isključivog nacionalizma Nasuprot demokratskim Procesima U Post-Komunističkoj Jugoslaviji". In *Evropa I Raspad Jugoslavije*, 1995 (ed. by) Radmila Nakarada op. cit. pp. 139-147; Zagorka Golubovic, 1995, "Emergence of Nationalist Peculiarities Opposite of Democratic Processes In Post- Communist Yugoslavia". In *Europe and Dissolution of Yugoslavia*, 1995, (ed. by) Radmila Nakarada op.cit. pp. 139-147

⁶ Louis Zanga, Why New Unrest in Kosova. In "Radio Free Europe ", Background Report, March 23, 1981; Bajram Kosumi, Pse I Organizuar Demonstratat me 1981(How We Organized the Demonstrations in 1981) *Koha*, Prishtina , no.6, 3March, pp.31-8 ; Rexhep Ismajli, "The Right to Self- Determination". In *Kosovo in the Heart of the Powder Keg*, 1997, (compiled and ed. by) Robert Elsie, East European Monographs, Boulder, pp.195-206

⁷ Veton Surroi, "Vicious Circles of the Kosova Pattern ". In *Pogledi- Casopis Za Kriticku Teorije Drustva I Kulture*, vo.2 Split, Travanj-Lipanj 1988

creating impotence of the society to react and take a grip on politics, that contributed to opening of the Pandora's box of nationalism .

This system with the changes of the 1974 Constitution and with the Communist management at its head, faced far-reaching difficulty in transforming the Communist political system into democratic one, and instead democracy produced ethno-nationalism which would become the only surviving competitor on the political stage.⁸ This was the reason that by the end of 1980, it had been created the situation whereby every issue, however trivial, acquired ethnic national meaning, and in the words of one journalist, spoken in 1989, one could not say in Communist Yugoslavia that a given individual was politically inclined to the right or left: " The only meaningful political level was Slovene, Croat, Albanian etc. This was confirmed as well by another Slovenian journalist, *Miha Kovac*, to the *New Left Review* in 1988. According to him, nationalism or local interest's of Yugoslavia become a kind of surrogate for all other political identities, and being active in any one of the existing political structure it was possible only on the basis of defending the interests of your republic or province.⁹ Thus, the system that was supposed to be ideologically and politically unified after "defeating" the Croat and other nationalisms, in the 1970s, turned to be itself most conducive to nationalism.

The nationalism thus appeared in that manner that the differences and not common values were to prevail and gain legitimacy in a way that small differences, religion and culture among peoples tended to be the focal point among different groups. These were later used for the nationalist interpretation of history, selective and manipulative version that turned to be the key objective to explaining the

⁸ George Schoplin, op.cit. pp.81-93

differences among those various groups.¹⁰ Napoleon's saying that " history is nothing more than mutually agreed set of lies" nowhere proved as correct as with the Serbian and Croatian version of history where each side preserved the victimization evidence for themselves and represented the others as villains. ¹¹

After nationalism positioned itself firmly, especially by the mid-1980, the relations among the republics were polarized. Although in Yugoslavia the Serbs, for instance, shared many common interests with the Montenegrins as well as with Macedonians and they have repeatedly courted the Bosnia – Herzegovina as a natural ally, these relations would be utterly changed. Particularly Montenegro became sharply polarized between anti- Serbian and pro- Serbia nationalists, resulting in a worsening of the political climate among Montenegrins. ¹²

In worsening of the political climate an impact have had the already existing tensions, whereby all nationalists from the Former Yugoslavia, particularly the Serbs and Croats, continued to insist that their nation was most oppressed. But, if one looks at the statistics and other barometers of oppression, the conclusion would certainly be that the Albanians and Croats were the most persecuted peoples in Yugoslavia instead of the Serbs. ¹³

It is this the background that characterized nationalism of the 1980s, after the death of Tito, where many frustrations of contemporary epoch and of modern

⁹ Interview, Miha Kovac: "The Slovene Spring", *New Left Review*, no.171 (September-October 1988), pp.115.

¹⁰ Raju G.C.Thomas, 1996, *The South Slav Conflict*, op.cit. pp.17

¹¹ *ibid*, pp.17

¹² *Borba*, July 28/29, 1990, p.13. See also *Vjesnik*, July 23, 1990, p.3, *Borba*, November 13, 1990, p.13, 1990. See also *Vjesnik*, October 13, 1990, p.5

¹³ Bennett, op.cit, pp.78

society provided a fertile psychological ground for nationalism and lied a strong basis that during the end of the 1980s became the driving force towards the dissolution of Yugoslavia.

The rise and fall of the nationalism in Yugoslavia cannot be analyzed through its deprivation from one of the main segments, that is, without taking into account self-management and economy in which the State was both anywhere and nowhere. Yugoslav version of Socialism proved to be very fertile ground for the most aggressive nationalism in modern Europe.

3.2. Problems Coming Out of the Implementation of the Self-Management

To explain the Yugoslav crisis in all its aspects, one has to deal with one its main features, that is, with the self-management as one of the driving forces towards the Yugoslav crisis. Theoretically, the founding fathers of the self-management had only good intentions for they wanted to embrace and apply a new system of values. What was missing was the reality. In practice this application turned to be completely out of the way that was meant and comprehend.

Self-management as one of the characteristics that distinguished Yugoslavia from other Socialist systems, conceived that the workers as the performers of the work, should be granted the rights to conduct and control the conditions and results of their work performance. From them, it was required the participation in decision-making process on issues of great concern, including both the production process

and social policy.¹⁴ This meant that the workers, as the main participants of the work, had to make the decisions in conducting their work as well as to participate in the distribution of those goods.

Yugoslavia had been the first place that put the self-management into. The roots of idea, from a historical perspective, can be traced back in the form of the two models: one has to do with the model of the self-government that traces a line back to Prudhon and the other followed the Gramsci's footsteps. However, both models fall short when separating production from distribution, a goal that Yugoslav model aspired to put into practice.¹⁵

The conditions that caused the adaptation of self management stemmed from three factors. First, expulsion of Yugoslavia from the Cominform had a deep impact on choosing and developing the independent way of Socialist system. To adopt a new policy, the CPY began to criticize the absence of self-management and the existence of the great centralized power of the state over the economy. Second motive for adaptation of the instrument of self-management lies in, at least at the beginning, the necessary reform because the difficulties created in the economic sphere by Stalin's blockade shook the very bases of the new Socialist system of Yugoslavia. And a third motive for reform, which was probably only of minor importance at the beginning, but which steadily grew in influence as the years passed, was the suspicion felt by the non-Serb nations for any kind of centralized political and economic system.¹⁶ On this latter point there was clear inner contradiction within the system and the CPY in order to appease the voices of

¹⁴ Zagorka Golubovic, "Characteristics, Limits and Perspectives of Self-Government, Critical Reassessment". In *Yugoslavia in Turmoil after Self- Management*, 1991, (ed.by) James Simmie and Joze Dekleva, Pinter Publishers ,pp.33

¹⁵ *ibid*, pp.34-5

grievance took further steps by laying the faith under so-called self-managing Socialism, thinking that it was manageable instrument in creating conditions that would make possible solution in the future. Yet, the CPY's confidence that the combination of authentic federalism and self-managing Socialism would provide for the national question to be "correctly formulated" proved infeasible.

Self-management did not serve as the moral force for the unity of the socialist-managing community of nations and nationalities of Yugoslavia. In theory, this instrument was seen as the most appropriate one, considering that the economic response will abate the political crisis.¹⁷ In turn, it produced a negative impact on overall structure of the society, deepened further the political and economic problems.

The big discrepancies of the self-management that proved its miscarriage in the implementation were the contradictory aspects from the way it was anticipated and applied into the practice. The naïve view saw the self-management as if the workers were given the right to elect a "Worker's Council" and other bodies to discuss major questions of policy. These rights, in turn, were meant to be used to safeguard workers' interests and further the interests of the whole "collective " and, at the same time, the interests of the society as a whole. What was missing from this "Utopian " view, was the recognition of the existing conflicts of interest between groups within an enterprise and existing problems between the workers in an enterprise and the "society " in the other.¹⁸

¹⁶ Harold Lydall, 1984, *Yugoslav Socialism Theory & Practice*, Clarendon Press Oxford, pp.67

¹⁷ Laslo Sekelj, 1993, *Yugoslavia the Process of Disintegration*, Columbia University Press, New York

Although, there were the elements of workers self-management in the practice, in the Yugoslav enterprises, it is impossible to hold the stance that the workers really managed. Still, theoretically, they carried out and had in their control the major business decisions. In practice, though, the decisions were exclusively in the hands either of the management or, especially in recent years, of the local or regional politicians.¹⁹

It was not surprising that the self-managed worker felt himself manipulated. The enterprise benefits were manipulated, and the worker did not know who was doing that, the accountant, the lawyer, the director or somebody else. The worker's role was only to attending the meetings. Meetings ended with the formal voting on various points, and the worker's consent served only as an official endorsement that was required. For this reason no one asked anything and no one voted against.²⁰

In manipulating the enterprises the direct role was played by the CPY, since directors were selected by the Party, mainly on the political grounds, well until the second half of 1960. This political interference with running the economic enterprise was done by the CPY. The reason was that some professional managers of the enterprise acquired a big power position in decision-making process. That risked the CPY's role. Besides, this "ownership group" threatened the Socialist principles of "solidarity and equity".²¹ In fact, when Party saw how much expanded the role of managers, it took fright. It saw the danger of becoming

¹⁸ S. Goldstein, "Prijedlog 85", Glas iz Privrede ("Proposal 1985", A Voice From the Economy) Yugoslavia, Zagreb 1985

¹⁹ David A. Dyker, 1990, *Yugoslavia Socialism, Development and Debt*, Routledge, pp.53-54

²⁰ Harold Lydall, 1989, *Yugoslavia in Crisis*, Clarendon Press , pp.107

redundant. The CPY, in order to remaining in its positions, intervened by giving the managerial position to the CPY loyal members .²²

This form of self-management in Yugoslavia brought deformations within the system, such as bureaucratic stagnation. Furthermore, these factors generated new tensions. To overcome this, more reforms had to be introduced and that in a very bureaucratic manner. As the time passed, this logic led to the system's ultimate failure. With the 1974 Constitution, it was made an attempt to defuse these manipulative elements of the system and to maintain a single-party rule while broadening the scope for the decentralized activity. It inevitably broke-up the system's identity.²³

From the above, one can conclude that self-management needed a different kind of regulator-type of democracy in order to have realized its potentials for progress. Thus, the performance of the Yugoslav self-management in the absence of political democracy proved to be fatal. The same occurred to the *Perestroika* of Gorbachev, with the plans for sweeping economic changes. It failed just after 500 days, as it had Khrushchev's utopian promise of "developed communism".²⁴ Self management raised expectations but it failed to deliver on them. It was both a cause of success and of the very crises within the system itself during all the time Yugoslavia existed.

²¹ Self Schrenk, Cyrus Ardalan, Naval A. El Tatawy, *Yugoslavia*, 1979 (published for the World Bank), The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London

²² Bogdan Dentich, 1990, *Limits and Possibilities, The Crisis of Yugoslav Socialism and State Socialist System*, Minnesota Press, pp.52-58

²³ Catherine Samary, op.cit. 112

2.3. Collapse of the Economy

As we have seen self-management hindered the prosperity of the Yugoslav economy, being leaded in an ad hoc basis, by complex administrative business, and party cadres. This was to be the kernel of the negative impact on the Yugoslav state, which led to a bureaucratization of the society and recession of the economy until its total collapse.

Economic crises that swept Yugoslav system had an impact in the overall structure, especially during the 1980s and 1990s, exacerbated the system and deepened the already existing gap in the relations among the republics. Some argue that the economic crises were considered as the main factor of the dissolution. Yet, it was only one of the factors that caused dissolution for the prominent ones to cause it were of the political nature mainly. In favor of this approach is the statement of the Slovenian sociologist who said that "*the roots of the crisis are not of economic nature*"....²⁵ For the authors who argue that the roots of dissolution were of economic nature, the crises until the 1980s followed those of 1974, with one difference, that is, the absence of Tito's charismatic personality. Among them is *Zagorka Golubovic*. In trying to illuminate the causes of the dissolution of former Yugoslavia, she argues that "the peoples did not look for the rational way of going out of the circles of the economic crises so that they had to search for the "scape goats". Furthermore, she argues that "the real object that they found was that the dominant nation was establishing the hegemony over the others".²⁶ It is not our

²⁴ Nina L. Krushcheva, "The Ghost of Perestroika, Gorbachev Remembered", *Transition*, vol.5 no.3 March 1998, pp.68-70

²⁵ Gantar Pavel, Tomaz Mastnak, Silva Meznaric and Lev Sergej, "Yugoslavia's Permanent Crisis", *East European Reporter*, vol.2 no.2, 1986 pp.46-50

²⁶ Zagorka Golubovic, *Evropa I Raspad Jugoslavie*, 1995, (ed. by) Radmila Nakarada, op.cit. pp.145

aim to thoroughly discuss at this point the contentious issue as to which were the real causes of Yugoslav dissolution. It will be discussed later again.

It was obvious from the beginning that the stability of the Yugoslav system depended on its capacity to overcome the first Yugoslavia's failures and that in two ways: first, to overcome the country's underdevelopment and, the second, to reduce regional inequalities. This task was priority agenda for the CPY, but in practice it never realized. These divergences on the regions proved to be a fertile soil for extremist movements, because economic problems struck different regions and nations in different ways. Or, to put in another way, economic disparities between regions, self-management, decentralization reforms and economic crises, induced regional economic nationalism within Yugoslavia.²⁷ The latter became pivotal factor in impairing the overall stability of Yugoslavia.

From the outset, the CPY aimed at achieving of the equality among the regional disparities. For this reason they adopted the instrument of "policy of aid" for the underdeveloped regions, by promoting the special fund and accelerating the development of impoverished regions. These reforms were necessary since the critical phase in the development of the Yugoslav Communist system came in the 1960s.²⁸ This strategy of reform had as well other political goal. It was meant to shift control out of the political sphere and vest in the banking system, since most of the big banks had their offices in Belgrade and they tended to be seen in other republics as Serbia's banks, operating in Serbia interests. To lower the grievances of the republics, the CPY needed the new packet of reforms. This new approach of

²⁷ Boris Pleskovic and Marjan Dolenc," Regional Development in a Socialist, Developing and Multinational Country": The case of Yugoslavia", *International Regional Science Review*, vol.7 no.1, 1982 p.3

reforms faced the considerable opposition in Serbia, and in reaction they adopted an attitude of the passive resistance. In this way the investments in Serbia rose by nearly 12% while in the rest of the country by only 5%.²⁹ Unsatisfied with the investment situation, Party leaders in Slovenia and Croatia and to some extent elsewhere become very critical of the "centralist " regime that Serbia was pursuing. They began campaign to break this opposition and the sabotage of the reform, by requiring the economic liberalization and decentralization of the system.

The problem in itself was Kosova, being the most underdeveloped region. Tito's regime and those who ruled after him were aware that interregional economic realities would threaten the integrity of the Yugoslav Community and Kosova might explode in violence. In one visit to the Kosova region, Tito remarked that benefits from the raw materials had never reached the region of Kosova.³⁰ He promised that in future the investments would increase other production sectors. The promise was never realized in practice. Kosova remained the most impoverished area in former Yugoslavia due to the policy of investing only in the heavy industry and for the purpose of milking its natural resources.³¹

Aid policy for Kosova and other underdeveloped regions proved to be a failure. At the outset it was promising that the reform undertaken would entail radical changes, but it proved opposite and the 1970s would mark the last decade of the

²⁸ Dijana Plestina, 1992, *Regional Development in Communist Yugoslavia, Success, Failure and Consequences*, Westview Press, pp.57-62

²⁹ Lydall, 1989, op.cit.84

³⁰ "Fjalimet e fundit te Josip Broz Titos dhe Eduard Kardelit , ne Aktivin Politik te KSA te Kosoves", (The Last Speeches of Josip Broz Tito and Eduard Kardelj, in Autonomy Province of Kosova), *Komunisti*, Prishtine 1981, pp.7

³¹ Christine Von Kohl & Wolfgang Libal, "Kosovo the Gordian Knot Of the Balkans". In *Kosovo in the Heart of Powder Keg*, 1997 (ed. by) Elsie op.cit pp.50

growth. Yugoslavia was never managed to develop a common pattern and become a truly integrated economic area, and no doubt that this economic disparity exacerbated inter-ethnic conflict among the republics and autonomous provinces.³²

Communist system and the monopoly of the Party were as well catalyst of the crises. During the 1960s and 1970s more than a million Yugoslavs moved abroad to live and work. New middle class was emerging. It faced the limits of the Communist system, both in terms of initiative in economic sphere and investments. The bulk of private property and economic activity was under control of the League of Communists. This way of control made the individuals demotivated, and without prospective. Running economy under control of the CPY, created for the politicians a possibility to use all the means for their benefits. Among the most powerful instruments in their hands were the rotation of credit, foreign exchanges and vague regulation.³³ This way of management created bureaucratization of the society, and at the same time generated two-way track conflict, one among the entities of Yugoslavia and the other within them.

Nevertheless, economy of Yugoslavia began to decline with the hike in oil prices, in the Wake of the First Oil Shock. At the time, the only salvation from the crises was found in foreign loans, like so many countries in the Third World from Poland to Mexico.³⁴ The debt in fact marked the beginning of the end for the system. All the funds were used by the regions of Yugoslavia, without exceeding the borders. Investments went mainly to the privileged and protected sectors of society and that

³² Xavier Bougarel, "Bosnia and Hercegovina- State and Communitarism ". In *Yugoslavia and After*, 1996,(ed.by) Dyker, Vejvoda

³³ David A. Dyker, 1990, *Yugoslavia, Socialism, Development and Debt*, op.cit. pp.63-66

³⁴ Susan L.Woodward, 1995, *Balkan Tragedy,Chaos and Dissolution After the Cold War*, the Brookings Institution Washington DC pp.47

led to the significant over capacity.³⁵ If all those sums were invested wisely Yugoslavia might have been saved from the economic collapse of the 1980s, but they were not. Investments become factor that far from promoting cohesion had not only failed to diminish national differences, but also actually exacerbated them. The north and south complained. The North complained of excessive waste in southern investments, considering them as the “black holes”, and the southern parts considered that, in the long run, the development of the south was the most rational strategy. ³⁶ Despite all these crises and an abortive structural reform, the ruling political elite never gave up the idea of controlling in a hegemonic way the political situation and the investments. This monopoly impaired and brought the crises to its vicious circle.

The situation worsened by October 1987. Inflation hit 200% and by August 1989 it would be 893.8%. That brought Yugoslav economy to its total collapse.³⁷ Marxism- Leninism was an economic catastrophe. Yugoslavia fossilized in the way the other revolutionary states did, the early dynamism faded, and the original revolutionaries burned out.

Because of the crises, that swept Yugoslavia throughout, Prime Minister of the time Mikulic resigned. His successor was appointed Ante Markovic. The reforms that he undertook came to full legitimacy in the period when the party elite had lost its credibility, and the new political elite had not yet come to power. His policy package was based on the “Socks Plan” for Poland., and he was liberal who

³⁵ Bruce Mcfarlane, 1988, Yugoslavia, op.cit. pp. 127 ; Ivo Bicanic, “Fractured Economy”. In *Yugoslavia a Fractured Federalism*, 1988 (ed. by) Rusinow, op.cit. pp.132

³⁶ Dijana Plestina op.cit. pp.75 ; Schierup ,C.U. “Prelude to Inferno-Economic Disintegration and Political Fragmentation of Yugoslavia”, *Balkan Forum*, no.8 , pp.89-120

³⁷ E. Zizmond, 1991, “Specifnosti Inflacije u Jugoslaviji”,(Specificities of Inflation in Yugoslavia), (Zagreb, Naprijed);

believed that the only possible exit from Yugoslavia's economic inertia was a switch to a free market economy and privatization of the economy.³⁸ His policy was very promising, and the first concrete measures in a recovering of the economy were the new *dinar*, strictly tied to the German Mark. Making the *Yugoslav dinar* convertible and centralizing all values and foreign currency payments, it made it possible to increase the foreign currency payments. During this time reserves of the country reached \$ 5.1 billion, due to 15% increase of export.³⁹ This led to a flood of foreign currency into the National Bank. From these transactions mostly benefited the Serbian Banks making possible to place a large portion of the resultant foreign currency into the National Banks in foreign countries, particularly in Cyprus, throughout banks in Europe and America.⁴⁰

Economy in a way started to recover, but the political scene was becoming very turbulent, since from the autumn of 1987 it has been dominated by Slobodan Milosevic. From then onwards, the communist ideology could no longer provide political legitimacy on a long-term. The essential crises that followed those of economic nature, would be now on the scene: Who should rule after Tito ?!

Western Governments and "experts" remained in thrall to the naïve idea that Yugoslavia's problems were primarily economic and therefore believed that if only prices would stabilize, then the political tensions inside the Federation would melt away. Still, the west seemed unaware that Milosevic's concept of a recentralised Yugoslavia was incompatible with Markovic's free market vision of Yugoslavia.

³⁸ Paris Kitsos, "A Glimpse of Yugoslav Economy", Hellenic Foundation For Defense and Foreign Policy, Yearbook 1989, (special issue), Southern Eastern Europe, Eliamep, pp.187

³⁹ *ibid* pp.188

⁴⁰ W. Raymon Duncan & G. Payl Hofman 1992 (eds.), " *Ethnic Nationalism and Regional Conflict. The Former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia* ". Westview Press Inc, pp.205

The two political actors were not in one line.⁴¹ When Slobodan Milosevic illegally extracted from the National Bank of Yugoslavia \$ 1.8 billion, just prior to the Serbian elections, policy of Ante Markovic went underway.⁴² Milosevic succeeded in remaining the only political actor and proved that political factor can prevail over economy.

3.4. Wrong Turn In Kosova

Since the death of Tito, the Yugoslav federation plunged into most severe economic and political crises it had experienced since its expulsion in 1948, from the Communist bloc controlled by Stalin. The Yugoslav economy fragmented into six "republican" economies, each run by its local communist elite, plagued by huge burden and a spiraling inflation, led to abyss of the state. This bankruptcy had impact on the Serbs, thinking that the crises had particularly affected them. The demonstrations of Albanians in 1981 that broke out in Kosova proved as well that Communist Party was incapable of halting continued Albanian political unrest. There were two reasons that, in 1986, forced the *Serb Academy of Arts and Sciences* to commission a committee, composed of well-known Serb writers, economists, philosopher, historians and linguists, to draft a memorandum addressing the causes of the continuing crises in Yugoslavia and proposing remedies.⁴³ This draft would be a guide to forge the Serbs aspirations, in

⁴¹ Reneo Lukic and Alen Lynch," U.S Policy Towards Yugoslavia: From Differentiation to Disintegration". In *The South Slav Conflict*, 1996 (ed. by) Thomas, Friman op. cit. Pp.253-287

⁴² Almond, op.cit.15; Warren Zimmerman, United States last ambassador to Belgrade(Yugoslavia), admits the exertion of \$1.8 billion by Milosevic, and says that he might have used the money for financing the election campaign of December 1990. See Warren Zimmermann, 1996, *Origins of a Catastrophe. Yugoslavia and Its Destroyers: America's Last Ambassador Tells What Happened and Why.* (Albanian translation by " Besa". Publishing House. Tirana Albania ,1997,p.92)

⁴³ For the full text of the Memorandum of the Serbian 'Academy of Sciences and Arts, in Serbo-Croatian, see, "*Nase Teme*" 33 (1-2).Zagreb, 1989 pp.128-163. For its essential parts in English, see, Fehmi Pushkolli - Limon Rushiti - Fehmi Rexhepi - Jusuf Bajraktari - Izber Hoti (ed.)

embodying the line of the turmoil and deterioration of the country toward the break-up.⁴⁴

The draft in its first part, offered a wide range, but essentially Marxist critique of the economic and social policies of the Yugoslav Communist Party since the early 1960s. The second, shorter part, entitled "*the Status of Serbia and the Serbian Nation*" arguing that from the early 1960s the Serb nation was subjected to discrimination throughout Yugoslavia, especially with the constitution of the 1974, considering as the act of preventing the Serbian people to complete national and cultural integrity.⁴⁵ Furthermore, they have designated their ambitions on their foreign policy for accomplishment of the national goals. Although the *Memorandum* was supposed to be confidential, it was soon after published in the Serbian press.

After the publication, the *Memorandum* was immediately denounced and repudiated by Ivan Stambolic, president of the Serbian Communists, considering the *Memorandum* "as nothing else but the darkest nationalism".⁴⁶ He made clear as well his opposition to "nationalistic poisoning of the youth".⁴⁷ But there is no doubt that it touched some sensitive nerves. It was witnessed in the VIII Session of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia held in September 1987, when a hard line fraction led by LCS President Slobodan Milosevic defeated the more liberal faction led by Serbia's president Ivan Stambolic and Belgrade

Expulsion of Albanians and Colonization of Kosova. Institute of History of Kosova and the Kosova Information Center. Prishtina, pp.80-87

⁴⁴ Aleksandar Pavkovic, From Yugoslavia to Serbism: The Serb National Idea 1986-1996, *Nation and Nationalism*, vol.4 Part4 October 1998

⁴⁵ Philip J. Cohen, "The Complicity of Serbian Intellectuals in Genocide in the 1990s". In *This Time We Knew, Western Responses to Genocide in Bosnia*, 1996, (ed. by) Thomas Cushman and Sjepan G. Mestrovic, New York University Press, pp.39-65

⁴⁶ John R. Lampe, op.cit. pp.340

⁴⁷ ibid. op. cit. pp.339

Party Chief Dragisa Pavlovic .⁴⁸ Triumph of Milosevic was the content of the new ideology of the new power-holders, based on nationalism. From that moment Milosevic clearly understood the potential strength of nationalism in Serbia and relied heavily on it.

Milosevic in particular wanted a new strategy in the political scene, the strategy that was backed from the Serb intellectuals, and which began to regard Milosevic the most appropriate person in execution of their aims designed in the blueprint of the Memorandum. The new political scene, with the new strategy and with the new pivotal force, thus emerged. Playing with the card of nationalism, the new conjure relegated an aggressive and authoritarian nationalism based on a critical mass of prejudice, ethnocentrism and war-mongering that rendered it different from all others nationalisms in Yugoslavia.⁴⁹

During all this time , the Kosovar Albanians and the Kosova issue would be the most discerned flash point. They demanded to be an equal nation of Yugoslavia. The situation would be used by Serb nationalists as a means of arousing the popular sentiment. It began with the mass psychological preparation developed between 1985-1990, consisting of mass meetings which were professionally organized and that continued without interruption from 1986 until the famous “Vidovdan meeting” at the Kosova field on June 1989.⁵⁰ Earlier, on April 1987, Milosevic delivered his famous speech and promise to the Serbs by saying that

⁴⁸ Dragisa Pavlovic, head of the Belgrade communists, on the occasion of his revocation from the post in September 1987 (the famous 8-th Session of the Belgrade communists) warned that Serbs could very easily come into the conflict with others if they were to insist on living within one state. See, Dragisa Pavlovic, 1988, *Olako Obecana Brzina*, (Globus, Zagreb) pp.331

⁴⁹ Slavoljub Djukic, 1992, *Kako se Dogodio Vodja, Borbe za Vlast u Srbiji Posle Josip Broza(How The Leader Happened, Fighting's for Power After Josip Broz,)* (Filip Visnjic, Belgrade) pp. 124-130;

⁵⁰ John Zarnetica, 1992, *The Yugoslav Conflict. Adelphi Paper no.270*, The International Institute for Strategic Studies , pp. 26; *Le Monde*, July 12, 1989, pp.6; Malcolm op.cit. pp. 188

"nobody can't beat you any more". It gave the new impetus to the Serbian nationalism by marking the highest level of national euphoria, promoting psychological preparation and war hysteria and, consequently, implementation of the plan for Greater Serbia.

On the other hand, Milosevic was promoted to the new leader, a figure that had the potential strength to become an archetypical "autocratic populist" or a cult figure. In his way to building the political carrier, Milosevic exploited the Serb nationalism rooted among ethnic Serbs, across regions and even republics. The manner in which the Serbian nationalism was launched was perhaps not so specific in itself. Its uniqueness lies on the form in which it was presented, and the solution that was soon offered. These aspects of Serbian nationalism significantly differed from other similar cases.⁵¹

Milosevic appeared as a specific sample that would have a direct impact in the course and the flow of the events that led to the dissolution of Yugoslavia. These samples are not unrecognized for the modern history of the nineteenth Century and early period of East-Central European history, that in each of the countries, certain individuals emerged and had an enormous impact on the outcomes. On the risks posed by Milosevic, after he grabbed the power, Harold Lydall wrote the following : " This kind of combination of Serbian nationalism with dogmatic Marxism, will create serious danger for the future of Yugoslavia ".⁵² It became true since Milosevic was still an old-style, hard-line Communist leader with equally old-style political ideas, and in his political perceivment, there was no place within

⁵¹ Jovan Cvijic, *Studies in Yugoslav Psychology*, *Slavonic Review*, vo.9,1990/91, pp.668 ; Janusz Bugajski, 1993, *Nations in Turmoil*, op.cit. pp.125 - 136

⁵² Lydall, 1989, *Yugoslavia in Crisis*, op.cit. pp.202

movement's basket for concepts like human rights, civil society, multiparty democracy.⁵³

Since the Serbian opinion was the most sensitive to the case of Kosova, the first promises of Milosevic were that he would make a very quick solution to this question. His plan was endorsed by the intellectuals, considering Kosova the cradle of the Serbian Nation. Matija Beckovic, head of Serbia's Writers Association, in an Extraordinary Assembly of the Serbian writers on March 4 1989, declared that "there is so much blood and so many sacred relics that Kosova will remain Serbian land, even if not a single Serb remains there".⁵⁴ These were the mutual outcomes that Milosevic would be viewed by the intellectuals as the man of a strong will and apt to establish an efficient and competent regime. To the situation much of the help was given by media. From 1987 to 1989 there was an offensive focused against Albanians and alleged Islamic conspiracy and Tito's vision of Yugoslavia.⁵⁵

First steps towards the implementation of the promised policy on Kosova would be to encourage the new wave of Serb colonists with promises of jobs and houses. These were the first initiatives undertaken by the Serbs in order to change ethnic balance. The policy was designed to influence the centrifugal forces that⁵⁶ sometimes included outside elements so that they clashed with strong ethnocentric trends (Albanians had the highest birth rate in former Yugoslavia) in an unprecedented manifestation of sociopolitical interstate turmoil. For the first time

⁵³ Slobodan Antonic (1995) *Vlada Slobidana Milosevica, Pokusaj Tipoloskog Odregjenja* (The Government of Slobodan Milosevic, an Attempt at a Typological Definition) *Srpska Politicka Misao*, no.1, pp.96-97

⁵⁴ Sabrina, 1992, *Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia* (1962-1991) op.cit pp. 243

⁵⁵ Paul Mojzes, 1995, *Yugoslavian Inferno* op.cit. pp. 82-83, 138-139

⁵⁶ Benett, op.cit. pp.100

the dispute transcended Yugoslavia's political scene when on 24th November 1988 the successor to the Communist dictator of Albania, Ramiz Alija, reacted against this Serb policy in an effort "to limit the autonomy and rights of Kosova and all Albanians as recognized by the present Yugoslav constitution". This attack from the President of Albania, on behalf of the ethnic Albanians living in the other side of the border, made it possible for the Belgrade to accuse Albania of interfering with its internal affairs.⁵⁷

For this reason Kosova has become the new locus of ethnocentric malaise, and while the Croatian nationalism and its political consequences represented the principal threat to the integrity and stability of the Yugoslav federation in the late 1960s and early 1970s, Kosova became the most critical source of disequilibrium in the country. With the new position based on the 1974 Constitution, Kosova issues directly affected relations between Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia and had a direct impact in interrepublican balance of power.⁵⁸

Considering the 1974 Constitution as a barrier act to the implementation of his strategy, Milosevic's next move would be the suspension of the autonomy of the provinces. As a result of the so-called "anti-beurocratic revolution" there were arrests of the Albanian Kosovar leadership in early March 1989. They were charged with "organizing miners hunger strikes and demonstrations" that followed in the Kosova province after the changes to its constitution. Changes made on the Kosova's Constitution were as a result of the "force behind".⁵⁹ It showed that

⁵⁷ George Harvalis, *Albanian Irredentism vs. Serbian Ethnocentrism*(The Kosovo Dispute: Threat to Balkan Regional Stability) 1989, Hellenic Foundation for Defense and Foreign Policy, (special issue) *Southeastern Europe, Eliamep*, yearbook pp.137-177

⁵⁸ *ibid*, pp. 137-177

⁵⁹ *Knocking on Europe's Conscience-Kosova: Evidence and Documents*, 1992,

Milosevic was eager on recasting the federation by tightening up and reducing power of the six constituent republics. The new Serbian position on the federation, after the abolition of Kosova's autonomy, created a new balance of power among the republics, having four votes under control. Milosevic managed to have under his control, besides Kosova and Vojvodina, the tiny republic of Montenegro.⁶⁰ On the other hand, Milosevic hoped to teach the lesson to the other republics for eventual dissobeyance since these actions were to be a model for the future behavior of the Serbian leadership towards other republics.⁶¹

The new position of Serbia, that turned it into a quasi-federal state, and the regime headed by Milosevic, as a communist appartchic who appears to endorse rudimentary form of Serbism, with objectives of Greater Serbia, assured a Serbian backlash. The Serbian nationalism reached the highest levels of ascendancy and provoked other nationalisms. It reached levels unknown since W.W.II. That marked the beginning of the future break-up of Yugoslavia. Nevertheless, while others nationalisms would have a common features, an obsession with the territory and nation who should rule over, the peculiarity of the Serbian nationalism would be the type of leadership that they had and the nationalism that they cultivated.⁶²

The wrong turn and one of the main drawbacks of the Serbian policy designed to achieve national goals was Kosova, since it lacked the clear ideas as to the way of

(Prishtina; CDHRF); B. Kelmendi and N. Kelmendi,(1992) Dismantling and Serbization of the Judicial System in Kosova , Kosova Watch, vol.1, no.2. August

⁶⁰ Srdjan Darmanovic ," Montenegro, Destiny of a Satellite State", *East European Reporter*, vol.5, no.2, March April 1992, pp.28

⁶¹ Dan Morgan. "Yugoslavia's Multiethnic Make Up Could Lead to Its Unraveling". *Washington Post*. 17,December 1989. Also available in Internet: <http://www.washingtonpost.com/longterm/bosvote/1989htm>.

⁶² Jovan Teokarevic, "Neither War Nor Peace: Serbia and Montenegro in the First half of the 1990s". In *Yugoslavia and After*, 1996, (ed. by) Dyker, Vejvoda

finding a lasting solution to the Albanian national question” .⁶³ The fact was confirmed by Dobrica Cosic in 1993, according to which, the problem of Kosova and Albanian political unrest is one of the most serious obstacles to the Serb political and economic regeneration: "Kosovo will be to Serbia a malign cancer which exhausts it, restricts its development and threatens it” .⁶⁴

⁶³ Willem Verner, 1992, *Disintegration of Yugoslavia* (ed. by) Heuvel, Siccama op. cit. pp.101

⁶⁴ Pavkovic, 1998, From "Yugoslavism to Serbism", *Nations and Nationalism*, op.cit pp.522

CHAPTER IV: THE BREAK-UP OF THE NATION

4.1. The Rich North Heads Toward The Secession (1989-91)

Crises on political system of Yugoslavia has started as a consequence of the changes made on the constitution of Serbia, whereby Serbia substantially increased its influence in the federation by controlling four votes of the collective presidency's eight, instead of one as previously. Kosova/o and Vojvodina as noted earlier lost their autonomus status after the constitutional changes to the 1974 Constitution made by Serbia. The changes that took place in 1989. The policy of Milosevic toward Kosova/o decisively determined the political course in the North and the events that followed afterwards.¹ As we shall see, after the 1990 elections in Slovenia and Croatia, as a reaction to Milosevic's hegemonic tendencies, the fate of the country would hinge on the hands of two leaders, Milosevic and Tudjman.²

In response to the events of 1989, Slovene Assembly decided to amend the Slovene constitution, allowing multiparty elections, to take place in the Spring of the following year. Croatia as well followed Slovenia's example so that in December of 1989 it ordered a constitutional change allowing for such elections. Thus, both republics followed Serbia's example by openly changing a major provisions of the 1974 Constitution, replacing one-party rule by the multiparty

¹ Carole Rogel, 1998, *The Breakup of Yugoslavia and the War in Bosnia*, Greenwood Press, pp.19-222

² Ivan Vejvoda, 1991, "Electing for War", A Critical Briefing on the Conflict in Yugoslavia, (*Yugofax*) no.5, 12, October, p.7 ; Misa Glennly, 1996, *The fall of Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan*

system. In the North , the changes took place with the consent of republican branches of the Communist Party, without reference to the central Party bodies.³ These changes in both republics were deemed necessary , since they wanted more and not less Yugoslavia, as long as Serbia was closely identified with the central power of the Yugoslav state.

While in Yugoslavia started the first phase of the political crises, in international arena with the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989 radical changes had been made. Gorbachev and his policy of a “ new thinking” for his country and the world, removed the sense of external threat that had functioned to produce an artificial unity. These changes carried with them the conceptual baggage of “freedom” and “ self-determination” and went towards a dramatic metamorphosis of capitalism and democracy.⁴ In this environment the politicians as well assumed new political identity in the transition from one-party hegemonic political system in the search of democracy and the market. Power players become concerned to establish new rules of conflict in a New World Order. Yet, the new Europe was being forged in a radically destabilised security environment.⁵

For Yugoslavs to follow these reforms it was needed much smaller step than for their neighbors in Eastern Europe but the international influence further worsened the relations among Yugoslavs in an atmosphere of the tense political situation

War, (3rd ed.) New York: Penguin. This author assigns greater responsibility for the war in the former Yugoslavia to Croatia and Tudjman than do most of the authors.

³ Milan Andrejevich, “ Slovenia’s State President Calls for Democracy”, *Radio Free Europe Research*, Yugoslavia, 10 November 1988, pp.27

⁴ Christopher Cviic, 1991, *Remaking the Balkans*, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, Pinter Publishers, pp.87 ; Daniel N. Nelson, *Balkan Imbroglio*, Politics and Security in Southeastern Europe, Westview Press 1991 pp. 121

⁵ Robin Alison Remington, “Yugoslavia and the Internationalization of the Conflict”. In *The South Slav Conflict*, 1996, (ed. by) Thomas, Friman, op.cit. pp. 229-252, Constatine Danopoulos & Kostas G. Messas,” Ethnonationalism, Security and Conflict in the Balkans”. (eds.)1997. In *Crises in the Balkans*.

that reigned that time. This was noticed in December 1989, on the eve of the fourteenth (Extraordinary) Congress of the CLY, when the Slovenia party leader *Milan Kucan* warned that the country was on the brink of the civil war. Some peoples still pinned hopes that any solution would be found on the Congress but it proved to be an illusion. The Slovenes being the wealthiest republic became preoccupied how to join Europe. Even the last congress of the Communist Party of Slovenia, was held under the slogan “ *Evropa Zdaj*” (Europe Now).⁶ Under this task they pushed in the Congress for more reforms , than the others could embrace. The LCY had for a long been divided into “reformists” and “dogmatic” wings and, more important, along territorial lines. In Slovenia and Macedonia the Leagues represented a moderate reformist nationalism, while those of Croatia remained more conservative. The Congress appeared deadlocked and, in frustration and protest, the Slovenian delegation walked out on January 23, causing the entire congress to fall apart. The “ Congress of Salvation “ ended into a complete fiasco.⁷ In the absence of the Slovenian delegation, Milosevic attempted to resume the Congress, but then the Croatian delegation too walked out, The Bosnian and Macedonian Communists were no longer prepared to continue, the meeting was suspended.⁸ The LCY broke-out and it was thwarted any further attempt of Milosevic to recentralise Yugoslavia via the LCY.

For the first time in Yugoslavia since 1918, the composing entities of Yugoslavia, as well as their populations, felt that they could decide their own destiny and their own future without anyone from the center in Belgrade dictating the rules to them.

⁶ Dusko Sekulic, "The Creation and Dissolution of the multinational state: The Case of Yugoslavia", *Nations and Nationalism*, 1997, pp.165-179

⁷ Tanjug (March 25,1990), translation in FBIS, Daily Report (Eastern Europe), January11, 1990, p.87

⁸ Borisav Jovic, 1995, *Poslednji Dani SFRJ*, "Izvodi iz Dnevnika"(The Last Days of SRFJ, “ Parts of the Diary”) Belgrade, Politika, pp.88

After the dissolution of the LCY, in compatibility with their constitutions, Slovenia and Croatia held their first parliamentary elections in 1990, that would be the first after the post war Yugoslavia. Undoubtedly, these elections symbolize the end of an epoch, but also the end of Yugoslavia as a united state. For this reason one Yugoslavian politician, causal links between the fall of Communism and the disintegration of Yugoslavia, found in the process of the victory of nationalist's party's, in a way considering the federal state as the main obstacle in their aspirations.⁹ And as long as victory was on the edge of the nationalists in all Yugoslav federal units, instead of representative democracy, it was established ethnodemocracy. Populous has been reduced to ethnos, and post-electoral policy only gave a new impetus to this political manipulation of the nation. Furthermore, in explaining the very essence of the crises of the Yugoslav state and the occurrence of the new political stage after the first multiparty elections in its federal units, Italian Foreign Secretary *Giani De Miculis* , made his comment that :” Yugoslavia could be either united but undemocratic, or democratic but in pieces”.¹⁰ That perfectly matched the situation after the elections.

The elections were held first in Slovenia. Those of Croatia took place a week after the conclusion of Slovenia's multiparty election (April, May). In Slovenia the winner was Kucan, member of the top Communist elite. In Croatia the election was won overwhelmingly by the Croatian Democratic Union, a heterogeneous movement and his trumbetary Tudjman who based his campaign squarely on the

⁹ Zagorka Golubovici, *Evropa I Raspad Yugoslavie*,(*Europe and the Dissolution of Yugoslavia*) 1995, (ed. by) Radmila Nakarada op. cit. pp. 143; Lenard J Cohen, 1993, *Broken Bonds, The Desintegration of Yugoslavia*, Westview Press 1993, pp.159-160; Slaven Letica, “ Proizvodnja Neprijatelja” (The Product of Enemy), *Danas*, April4,1989

¹⁰ Borba, May 17,1991

national question.¹¹ . These elections were followed by those in Bosnia and Herzegovina (October), Macedonia (November) and Serbia and Montenegro (December 1990). In Kosova, the elections were boycotted by the majority Albanian population.

Intrinsic part of the elections was that they were won by the members of the top Communist elite (League of the Communists of Yugoslavia), Kucan in Slovenia, Tudjman in Croatia, Milosevic in Serbia and Gligorov in Macedonia. These new adoption in a new model varied between the two extremes of Franjo Tudjman, once a communist, then a nationalist dissident, finally a nationalist president, and Slobodan Milosevic, the classic “nomenclature nationalist” and whose transformation from communist appartchik into nationalist leader was almost imperceptible.¹² After the elections Yugoslavia entered a new turbulent episode. That would be calamity of the democratic flow, and would mark the first phase that Yugoslavia went one step behind the developments that swept Eastern Europe in the democratic transformation.

To make the situation more tense helped media. It manipulated the peoples in favor of their leading politicians. The reputable and formerly independent Belgrade daily “*Politica*” became the most servile mouth piece of Milosevic while the Belgrade based “*Borba*” (the “Struggle”), the former official daily of the Communist Party, became far more independent and analytical newspaper than, for example, the “*Vjesnik*” in Zagreb that turned into an instrument of the Tudjman’s

¹¹ Marcus Tunner, 1997, *Croatia a Nation Forged in War*, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, pp.223; See as well, Marco Prelec , “Franjo Tudjman’s Croatia and the Balkans”. In *Crises in the Balkans*, 1997, (ed. by) Danopoulos, Messas, op. cit. pp. 75-89

¹² Dyker, David A. "Nomenklatura Nationalism, The Key to the New Eastern European Politics", *Australian Journal of Politics and History*, vol 41, no.1, 1995, pp. 55-69

government.¹³ Still, particularly the veneries was the Belgrade press, because its journalists created a baggage of misinformation. They would impute statements to their opponents as being "anti-Yugoslav" or even more sinfully "anti-Serbian"¹⁴ That built up the great fear among the ordinary Serbs and was all the times crucial for Milosevic's regime. During this time, there was a very important element, that is, the ruling parties in Serbia and in Montenegro never abandoned the hard core of monopoly over the most influential media and over key economic sectors and enterprises, besides the police and the army.¹⁵

A serious blow that paralyzed the entire federal system was made by Serbia in May in 1991 when it refused to go alone, with what should have been a routine "proclamation" of Stipe Mesic, Croatia's representative in the presidency, as its president for one year. Serbians refused his election judging him as "anti-Yugoslav". This act left Yugoslavia without a head of state for the first time since 1945. More important, it left the Yugoslav army without its commander-in-chief. That was followed by the blockade in other institutions. The work of the Federal Assembly was impeded, since its decisions required formal approval from the presidency before becoming law. It was the period that Yugoslavia entered the most serious phase that turned to be a final one towards the secession.¹⁶

¹³ Paul Mojzes, 1994, *Yugoslavian Inferno* op.cit. pp.54 ; Carl G. Hobsen, "War Crimes in the Balkans: Media Manipulation, Historical Amnesia, and Subjective Morality". In *South Slav Conflict*, 1996,(ed. by) Thomas, Friman, op. cit. 331-349

¹⁴ *ibid*, pp.45

¹⁵ Vladimir Goati,1995, *Peculiarities of the Serbian Political Scene in Challenges of Parlamentarism, The Case of Serbia in the Early Nineties*, Institute of Social Science, Belgrade, pp. 202

¹⁶ Christopher Cviic, "Yugoslavia; The Unmaking of a Federation" . In *The Volatile Powder Keg, Balkan Security After the Cold War*, 1994, (ed. by) F. Stephen Larrabee, Rand 1994. Pp.99

The secession by the North was considered as an alternative, being convinced that Serbian nation would create system in which it would be worse off.¹⁷ This political scene made it much easier for Kucan and his allies to preach Slovenian secession and win sympathy in the West for his cause.¹⁸ That is why the separatist movements in Slovenia and Croatia are to be regretted in many respects because they were primarily a response to the political climate created by Milosevic.

4.2 Attempts To Save the State: Negotiations about Yugoslavia's Restructuring on the Eve of its Dissolution

Just prior to the blockade of the federal institutions, the north republics, Slovenia and Croatia, took the initiative by proposing the drafts for the transformation of the system of Yugoslavia. They made their efforts with other republics to achieve any agreement whatsoever. But it revealed that that the stances that they maintained, and the tendencies that other republics had for any restructuring of Yugoslavia, were too different. There again surfaced the planes of the Serbian policy that differed substantially from those nourished in the North. Failure of the negotiations led to a new phase, that is, that of dissolution through the civil war.

First initiatives for the future of Yugoslavia were taken by the top communist Slovenian and Croatian officials, *Ribicic and Tomac*. They came up with the idea of the so-called "asymmetrical federation" in 1989. The idea was initially elaborated in the Slovenian communist program that proclaimed the parallel existence of two systems in Yugoslavia: the developed and pluralistic "West" and the undemocratic and economically underdeveloped "East" under the Communist

¹⁷ Susan Woodward, 1995, *Balkan Tragedy, Chaos and Dissolution* op. cit. pp.117

monopoly.¹⁹ After the LCY fell apart and a month before the Mesic case blew up, Slovenia and Croatia proposed transformation of Yugoslavia into an alliance of sovereign states, presented in the form of a confederal contract, modeled on the organization and work of the European Community, with specific variations to meet Yugoslavia's special needs. Thus, a common currency, foreign policy, and defense were to be retained within the new Federation/Confederation and the decisions would have to be reached univocally.²⁰

With this draft Serbia and Montenegro did not agree. They rejected the proposal and indicated that they favored a more centralized Federation than that of Yugoslavia under the 1974 Constitution. The Serbs were once again championing the strong center. For them, any division into a several states separating parts of the Serbian people and put them within separate sovereign states was unacceptable. They emphasized that the confederation was not a state.²¹ At the impasse of the agreement, the two republics also declared their clear intentions to seek the re-drawing of the Yugoslavia's internal borders with the aim of ensuring that all Serbs (and Montenegrins) live within one state. This was the first time that they promulgated their preparations for an aggressive war if other republics should pursue different goals.

Others repudiated the Serb/Montenegrin draft. In this unduly embroiled situation Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia were the most threatened republics, politically and economically, by any Yugoslavia's fragmentation. They prompted with the

¹⁸ David Binder and Walter R. Roberts, "The Only good Serb is a"...*Mediterranean Quarterly*, vol.9, no.3, Summer 1998, pp. 34-36

¹⁹ Sekelj, 1993, *Yugoslavia the Process of Disintegration*, op. cit. pp.247

²⁰ Christopher Cviic, *The Volatile Powder Keg*, 1994, (ed. by) F. Stephen Larrabee, op. cit. pp. 99

²¹ *Review of International Affairs*, 1991, no. 989, 20 June Belgrade. This review gives the standpoint of all the various republican governments, on how the crisis should be settled.

third model that sought to combine the features of the first two. Anyhow, it is not an accident that they were more interested than the other republics for finding the compromising solution in keeping together the Yugoslav Federation, with whatever the cost. To satisfy the claims of the North and those of Serbia and Montenegro, they developed a compromise proposal: a union at several different speeds, more "confederate" for Slovenia and Croatia and more binding for the others.²²

It was obvious from the very beginning of the negotiations, that Slovenia and Croatia entered in a wavered way. One way involved their efforts to commence persuading the other republican leaders that they should work together in finding the models for the future confederal alliance, and the second way, parallel with the first one, was the permission of the authorities in Zagreb and Ljubljana to proceed with alert and with the further steps towards the complete political and military independence from the existing federal structure.²³ This strategy was anticipated as necessary, since the crucial problem was that it lacked the confidence in its advocate Milosevic, and the mortgage of Kosovo had been burdening it even further.²⁴

From the outset, the negotiations showed the verge of the failure since the variations in the actors' aims were in the deep discrepancy. Each republic conceded and justified their ambitions and the maximum of desired goals instead of negotiating a mutually acceptable compromise. Slovenia and Croatia unsatisfied with the course of the negotiations proceeded with their own intentions.²⁵

²² Catherine Samary, 1995, *Yugoslavia Dismembered*, op. cit. pp.72

²³ Lenard J. Cohen , 1995, *Broken Bonds* op. cit. pp. 198

²⁴ Sekelj, op. cit. pp. 256

²⁵ Tanjug, September, 1990, pp.3

The matters came to a head on June 25, 1991, when first Slovenia and then, a few hours later, Croatia declared the independence, with the justification that Yugoslavia was not in transforming process that would have been acceptable to them. Both based their decisions on referendums held on December 23, 1990, in Slovenia and on May 19, 1991 in Croatia. As much as Slovenia was with the ethnically homogeneous structure, 95% were declared for "yes" to the question of whether they wanted Slovenia to become a sovereign and independent state, while only 4% voted against.²⁶ In Croatia, though, participated only 86% of the voters due to its ethnic heterogeneous composition. In it did not participate the rural part, where the Serbs formed the majority of population and which were in a state of rebellion against the government in Zagreb. Even that the referendum was formulated as the choice, not between the independence and Yugoslavia but between the federalism and the union of sovereign states .

When Slovenia proclaimed its independence, it started with the printing of the banknotes called "*lipa*" in October 1991, and opened its first diplomatic mission in Belgium. That it is why Milosevic by spring 1991 began to acknowledge that the secession of a nearly ethnically homogenous republic, such as Slovenia, with no substantial Serbian community, might become politically inevitable and even acceptable. But the situation differed in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, where used to live a large Serbian community and the secession was not acceptable, unless major adjustments between Croatia and Serbia would be negotiated.²⁶ In a comment to these declarations, Borislav Jovic, a Milosevic's aide, stressed that Milosevic took over a task and the duty for action on issues that King Alexander

²⁶ Cviic 1994, (ed by) Larrabee, op. cit. 99

had done in 1928, that is, to keep the rest of Yugoslavia without Slovenia, including the Serbian populated areas of Croatia.²⁷ The view of Milosevic was backed from the army in order to defend its privileges and the federation rather than any project of Greater Serbia or Milosevic's call. Since now, the Serbian elite and the General Staff of the JNA shared common interest in preserving Yugoslavia without any major restructuring. The JNA threatened Slovenia and Croatia that any attempt for unilateral secession from the federation was unacceptable and would be considered as an illegal act so that they were going to react by force.²⁸

The JNA threat unduly embroiled the already tense situation. For this reason, the CIA warned on November that year that Yugoslav experiment had failed and that the country would violently fall apart within eight months although Washington's policy still remained firmly committed to the unity of Yugoslav state.²⁹ Even though the international community after the deadlock in the negotiations became alarmed that their failure might lead to a violent break up of Yugoslavia, it still maintained the stance in favor of the further unity and the status quo.³⁰ This was a clear expression that the West would not respond to the aggression. This Western stance enabled the domination of the Serbs and Montenegrins in the Yugoslavian diplomatic corps and that helped them to turn it into a crucial campaign team in support of aggression. The strategy that the Serbs were using was very simple, historical alliance with Russians, those of "traditional friends" (France), those

²⁶ Lenard J Cohen, op. cit. pp.210

²⁷ Tim Judah, op.cit. 23-25; Borisav Jovic, 1995, *Poslednji Dani SFRJ*, op. cit. pp.88

²⁸ The much criticized speech of the minister of defense general Kadijevic, on the eve of Serbian elections in December 1990, was a call to support socialism, and thus Milosevic's ex-communist Socialist party- rather than Milosevic himself.; Veljko Kadijevic, 1993, *Moje Vidjenje Raspada* (Beograd: Politika) pp.107-109; James Gow, 1992, *Legitimacy and the Military, Yugoslav Crisis*, St. Martin Press, pp.1; Laura Silber & Alan Little, 1995, *Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation*, London, Television Books; Warren Zimmerman, the Last Ambassador. A Memoir of the Collapse of Yugoslavia. *Foreign Affairs*, March, April 1995 p.13

²⁹ New York Times, November 28, 1990, pp.7

established through historical manipulation (demonetizations of Muslims as religious fanatics and Croats as Nazis), and the exploration of the Holocaust (Israel and Jewish community), as well as those founded on political interest opposed to disintegration (Great Britain).³¹

The end of the negotiations without results faded any hope for the future of the state. The constitutional crises caused constitutional blockade, process of the decentralization caused process of secession, and the referendums of independence assured in a formal and democratic way the validity of the declarations for the independence. These conditions would be a strong ground for the dissolution of Yugoslavia in the days to come.³²

4.3. The Wars in Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina

The 1991 was a year of independence both in Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. Declarations of independence encompassed national self-determination. But still nobody, even those making the declarations, were clear enough as to what independence entailed. During that time three Baltic republics of the Soviet Union were also seeking independence. Soviet Union, by seeing the dissolution of Yugoslavia as a precedent for its own dissolution vigorously opposed the secession of Slovenia and Croatia. This was the reason why from the outset the United States favored the status quo in Yugoslavia fearing that the break up of the Soviet Union

³⁰ David Reisman, Western Responses to the Current Balkan War. In *This Time We Knew*, 1996, (ed. by), Cushman, Mestrovic, op.cit. pp. 350-358

³¹ Slaven Letica, The Genesis of the Current Balkan War. In *Genocide After Emotion, The Postemotional Balkan War*, 1996, (ed. by) Stjepan G. Mestrovic, Routledge, pp. 91-112

³² Lidija R. Basta, Evropa I Raspad Jugoslavie, (*Europe and The Dissolution of Yugoslavia*), 1995 (ed. by) Radmila Nakarada, op. cit. pp. 135

would destabilize the entire region of Europe.³³ One of the most important signals in favor of the Federation that openly directed the track towards the march of war was declaration of James Baker, the US State Secretary, made on June 22, 1991, emphasizing that the United States favored Yugoslav unity and that it would not recognize the independence of Slovenia and Croatia.³⁴ At the same time, it coincided as well with the declaration of NATO's commander, general John Galvin, who told to the one of the Belgrade's daily newspapers that NATO would not act in the zones that are not considered as its defense perimeter, stressing that Yugoslavia is one of those zones and therefore it would not intervene in a Yugoslav civil war.³⁵ The Serbs used all these signals to foster their already made plans that were sealed in the 1986 Memorandum and their prominent leader, Slobodan Milosevic, directed the plans' execution.

Analyzing the facts for finding the causes of the wars, first in Slovenia and Croatia and then in Bosnia-Herzegovina some authors such as *Susan Woodward* find them in the Slovene leadership that "rather on seeking a coalition within the country, they refused to participate in federal institutions and threatened to exist if others did not agree to their position"³⁶ Others, like *Zimmerman* the causes of the war found in the policy led by the two actors, Milosevic, considering him as a "opportunistic driven by power", and Tudjman, considering him as a nationalist with his policy of "separatist nationalism" after the elections. These two politicians have

³³ Alan Fogelquist, 1993, *Handbook of Facts on the Break - Up of Yugoslavia, International Policy and the War in Bosnia - Hercegovina*, © Alan F. Fogelquist, pp.12-13; Philip J. Cohen, "Ending the War and Securing the Peace in Former Yugoslavia". In *Genocide After Emotion*, 1996, (ed. by) Mestrovic op. cit. pp. 31-50

³⁴ Washington Post, 22 June 1991; The fact is that Lawrence Eagleburger (Deputy-Secretary of State and Brent Scowcroft (National Security adviser), seems that had impact, introducing emotional commitment to the Yugoslav cause, which blinded them to the real aims of Milosevic; See, David Gompert, " How To Defeat Serbia", *Foreign Affairs*, July August 1994, vol.73, no.4, cit. pp.33

³⁵ Tanjug (June1, 1991), in FBIS, Daily Report (Eastern Europe), June3,1991, p.43

³⁶ Woodward op. cit. pp.117

been regarded by others as well with the direct impact on break-up of the nation and the civil war.³⁷ Yet, as we have seen above the root causes of the war lie in a psychologically and logistically well-prepared program for aggression by the Serbian regime in Belgrade.³⁸ It had been designed for building the centuries old dream of Greater Serbia. The citation of *Slavenka Drakulic* that the "war is not difficult to understand at all since there existed a Serbian political elite to determine and start a war. It controlled the army, media and it head four years of systematic nationalist propaganda behind it".³⁹ It is the fact that this quotation utterly fits to the situation for commencing the war, and appropriate momentum was found at the time when international community favored the federation without seeing the conspicuous aggressive policy of Milosevic that did not let the room for any concessions. The United States and the West did not see these occurred events in a complete and real shape but in a reduced and simplistic manner as a fight between the "competing gangs".⁴⁰

Using this chance, the JNA (Yugoslav People's Army) started the first action on June 25,1991. They bombed the Slovenian airport at Brnik and Maribor and tried to seize control of Slovenia's borders. These actions the JNA justified as if in pursuit of its constitutional obligation to protect the territorial unity and integrity of Yugoslavia, even though they were without mandate of the Army's commander-in-chief, the presidency, that was paralyzed by the non election of Stipe Mesic as its

³⁷ Warren Zimmerman,1997, *Origins of a Catastrophe* ,(published by Besa-Tirana) op.cit., see Milosevic, Tudjman

³⁸ Roy Gutman, 1993, *A Witness to Genocide*, The 1993 Pulitzer Prize Winning Gompert," How To Defeat Serbia", *Foreign Affairs*, July August 1994, vol.73, no.4, cit. pp.33

³⁸ Roy Gutman, 1993, *A Witness to Genocide*, The 1993 Pulitzer Prize Winning Dispatches on the " Ethnic Cleansing " of Bosnia, Macmillan Publishin Company, pp.15

³⁹ Slaven Letica," The West Side Story of the Collapse of Yugoslavia and the Wars in Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia- Herzegovina". In *This Time We Knew*, 1996, (ed. by) Cushman, Mestrovic, pp. 177

⁴⁰ Dejvid Owen, *Balkanska Odiseja*, Radio B92, Beograd, pp.27

head in the May of that year.⁴¹ But, the war in Slovenia surprised unpleasantly the JNA. Defeat of the JNA troops was partly a consequence of a miscalculation about Slovenia's capacity to fight, lack of moral among the JNA troops and a reckless lack of preparation on the part of the Yugoslav high command. War in Slovenia ended with the so called *Brioni Declaration*.⁴² It was not an EC triumph, as it was believed, that coordinated the Troika's foreign ministers mission to Yugoslavia. It so occurred because the JNA decided unilaterally to pull out all of its troops and equipment within three months.⁴³ The reason behind was that Milosevic wanted a strong army to provide political competition about the future state. For that Milosevic's message was: "Let them go" (as general Kadijevic calls in his memoirs).⁴⁴ As long as the EC's involvement did not have the enforcement capability, and the intervention would be improbable, the JNA decided to fight for the borders of a "new Yugoslavia". In this context, its priority was to mount a counter-offensive which would confront the destroyers of the old Yugoslavia.⁴⁵ The next step would be Croatia.

The political situation in Croatia was very vulnerable after the elections, and the Tudjman's party, the HDZ, won. The key role was played by dr. Jovan Rashkovic, renown specialist for group therapy. He started his duty with priming the masses for insurrection and aggression, by proposing changes in the republic's constitution, that was incentive for violent confrontations, particularly in and

⁴¹ Eduard R. Ricciuti, 1993, *War in Yugoslavia, The Break-up of a Nation*, Blackbirch Graphichs Inc, pp. 26-27

⁴² Joint Declaration of the EC Troika and the Parties Directly Concerned with the Yugoslav Crisis, the so called Brioni Accord. Brioni- Croatia, 7July 1991. The text in Snezana Trifunovska, 1994, *Yugoslavia Through Documents, From its Creation to its Dissolution*. Kluwer Academic Publishers, pp. 311-315

⁴³ Stanoje Jovanovic, 1991, *The Truth About the Armed Struggle in Slovenia*, Belgrade, Narodna Armija, pp. 23-24

⁴⁴ Veljko, Kadijevic, 1993, *Moje Vidjenje Raspada*, op.cit. pp.131

⁴⁵ *ibid*, pp.131

around the Knin area populated with the majority Serb population.⁴⁶ Being aware of the provocation, Tudjman was anxious not to give a Belgrade a pretext for intervention. He was ready even to offer parts of Croatia, such as Vukovar, in exchange for a peaceful settlement, but since the "imaginary enemies" were the essence of Milosevic rule, he had no desire to end the conflict with Croatia. With the backing of the JNA as well with the backing of the Serbian Orthodox Church, that blessed the war as a "holy war" through publishing the articles on their contribution to the development of the culture of the Osijek and the articles on sufferings of the Serbs in Ustase concentration camp at Jasenovac, the preparations for another aggressive war got under way.⁴⁷ And in July of that year the war escalated dramatically (40.000 voluntaries joined the Serbian Guard and were organized under the auspices of the Serbian Renaissance Movement).

Only when the war broke out in Croatia, the attitude towards the federalism in former Yugoslavia changed. This was the reason that Lord Carrington, the Former British foreign secretary, was asked by the European Community to chair a peace conference in the Hague. After a long meeting on 16 December, the European Council of EC Foreign Ministers, discussed the question of recognition of the Yugoslav republics wishing to be recognized as independent.⁴⁸ In fact, after the

⁴⁶ Daniel N. Nelson, 1992, *Balkan Imbroglio, Politics and Security in Southeastern Europe*, Westview Press pp.2

⁴⁷ For a brilliant account of the role of the Serbian church in the national awakening of Serbs, see the work of Ivo Banac, Nationalism in Serbia. In *Balkans , A Mirror of the New International Order*, 1995, (ed. by) Gunay Goksay& Ozdan Kemali Saybasili, Marmara University

⁴⁸ James Gow, 1997, *Triumph of the Lack of Will*, Hurst & Company, pp.63; (EC Declaration Concerning the Conditions for Recognition of New States), adopted at the Extraordinary EPC Ministerial Meeting, Brussels, 16 December 1991, UN DOC.S/ 23293, Annex I, Trifunovska, op. cit. pp. 431-432. Within this context, EC made public its so-called "Guidelines on Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union". The recognition could be granted in the framework of a general settlement and have the following components: a. A loose association or alliance of sovereign or independent republics; b. adequate arrangement to be made for the protection of minorities, including human rights guarantees and possibly special status for certain areas, c. no unilateral changes in borders... UN DOC. S/ 23169, Annex

deal in Slovenia, Germany proposed the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia, considering that it would be a deterrent act against further army attacks in Croatia. Yet, it was not accepted by its EC partners.⁴⁹

Relative gains of a key states within EU: France, Britain and Germany, could be seen from the inception of the conflict in former Yugoslavia. Germany advocating the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia and two others opposing them by using their privileges in the UN Security Council in an attempt to block Germany for they feared the establishment or re-establishment of a German block in Central Europe.⁵⁰ German pressure for the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia came to peak in mid December just prior to the Masstricht Summit of EC heads of state which debated the future course of European monetary and political integration. Germany succeeded in persuading its partners, and the EC recognized Croatia and Slovenia on 15 January 1992 while Bosnia-Herzegovina was asked to have a referendum as a precondition for the recognition.

The EC lacked the military clout and could never be more than talking meeting⁵¹ It could not intervene in the conflict, even though at the outset of the war in Slovenia, Luxembourg's Foreign Minister Jacques Poss, who headed the initial Troika to Yugoslavia, was bold enough to declare that "this is the hour of

II. (Adopted at the Extraordinary EPC Ministerial Meeting in Brussels on December 16,1991). Hague Peace Conference had been replaced by the London Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY); see as well Marc Weller, "The International Response to the Dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia", *American Journal of International Law*, vol. 86, no. 3, July, pp. 569-607; Bojko Bucar, "Emerging New Criteria for the Recognition of States", *Journal of International Relations*, Ljubljana 4, 1-4, 1997, pp. 73-83

⁴⁹ Cviic, (ed.by) Larrabee, op. cit. pp. 102

⁵⁰ Joanne Wright, "European Security-Post Bosnia", *European Security*, vol.6, no.2, Summer 1997, pp1-17; Peter Viggo Jakobsen, " Myth-Making and Germany's Unilateral Recognition of Croatia and Slovenia". *European Security*, vol.4, no.3 Autumn 1995,pp.400-417

⁵¹ Leo Tindemans, 1996, *Unfinished Peace, Report of the International Commission on the Balkans*, (Berlin: Aspen Institute: Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment), pp.56

Europe".⁵² That was clear enough to show that the EU alone could not handle the crises despite the WEU being designated as the EU's military instrument.⁵³

Major reason to end the war in Croatia was not any international reaction. Rather, the stalemate of November was the main factor, with neither side in a position to make a significant progress. In a way, the recognition of Croatia appeared to have halted the war in Croatia since Milosevic decided to make a deal and called the United Nations to prepare a peace treaty. The UN agreement was signed in 1992.

If one looks closer to the strategy of the war, being further developed during the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, there could conclude that it was based on a combination of Soviet and Nazi doctrines (Soviet- encirclement and destruction's of towns and civil population, and the later including the so-called ethnic cleansing, concentration camps, and outright genocide.⁵⁴ This strategy was used as the means of securing the territorial gains. For that reason the Serbs from the beginning of the war decided to shift the Serb population of Western Slavonia to Eastern Slavonia where the Croat and and Hungarian majority had been ethnically cleansed. The objectives of the two belligerent parties were different. In the case of Croats, they fought for setting up a new state and they never sought to carry the fight beyond Croatia's border, despite the fact that JNA fighters were firing directly from Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia proper.⁵⁵ The Serbian objectives, though, were clear enough: the war of aggression with the aim of enlarging its state.

⁵² Bennett, op. cit. pp.160

⁵³ Joanne Wright op.cit. pp5

⁵⁴ Slaven Letica, *Genocide after Emotion*, 1996, (ed. by) Mestrovic op.cit. 91-112

⁵⁵ Cviic, *Remaking the Balkans*, op.cit. pp. 71

The same strategy would follow the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, that was among the bloodiest after the WW II. For a while it seemed as if the call of the international community "never again" would be obeyed. But, it did not happen. The Bosnia-Herzegovina tragedy marks the shame of humanity, especially of Europe.

The first clear military actions for the new borders would be seen in Bosnja-Herzegovina. They were undertaken at the same time as the war in Croatia was being intensified. Earlier, before the war broke out, the JNA had began a series of maneuvers across Bosnia-Herzegovina that enabled it to mobilize the Serbs from Bosnia to fight against its own state. To forestall the Serbian aggression, Bosnia-Herzegovina was recognized as an independent republic by the international community on 6 April 1992.⁵⁶

The fact that Bosnia-Herzegovina issue was very sensitive one led Lord Carrington on 6 January 1992 to come up with a plan for opening of the separate set of talks for the future of Bosnia-Herzegovina within the framework of the EC Conference. The talks began in Lisbon on 21-22 February 1992. The idea proposed by the hosts of the Conference, Cutiliero and Carrington, was based on a three "constituent units" within Bosnia. The plan confirmed the principle of ethnically territorial units that proved to be a cardinal mistake of the international Community for as long as it did not take firm action through a political decision to recognize Bosnia-Herzegovina in January. Thus, it proved to be the sirens for a Serbian campaign against the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina.⁵⁷

⁵⁶ James Gow, 1997, *The Triumph of the Lack of Will*, op. cit. pp.80-84

Izetbegovic, president of Bosnia-Herzegovina, being aware of the situation that might occur accepted the conditions as set out in the Lisbon Conference. Others from the Muslim side of the delegation pressed him to abandon the decision because of implications based on ethnic division. Furthermore, they still believed that U.S. aid would be on a way as soon as the Serbian aggression will start.⁵⁸ This was an impressible calculation on the Muslim side because U.S. abandoned Yugoslav unity, but still supported the idea of mediation and conflict resolution through the EC and OSCE as the most viable solution.⁵⁹ These mechanisms had no enforcement capacity and this proved fatal for the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

This U.S. reluctance in being involved in the conflict had very simple explanation. The United States did not have any geo-strategic interest. Besides, Bosnia-Herzegovina did not pose any threat to the international peace and security. This American stance was confirmed in July 1992 when the Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney referred to the conflict as an “internal civil war” rather than as a “cross border operation” or a “threat to international order”.⁶⁰ British government as well supported the stance, considering that conflict involves no vital interests and would not be justified the use of western troops in the conflict.

Muslims still believed that the West or more precisely U.S. will start aiding them. It was this reason that the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina had not been formed until May 1992 and state of war was declared only in June 1992. By that time the Serb forces had already overrun much of the Republic. The Bosnian side felt betrayed and abandoned by the international community which had recognized Bosnia-

⁵⁷ *ibid.* pp. 84

⁵⁸ Lenard J. Cohen, 1993, *Broken Bonds*, op.cit.243

⁵⁹ Fisher, M. "Germany's Role Stirs Some Concern in U.S", *The Washington Post*, 23 January

Herzegovina but refused to defend its territorial integrity. To make the situation harder for the Muslims, an arms embargo had been approved against all Yugoslavs while the war in Croatia was still in progress.⁶¹ This resolution caused difficulties for Bosnia-Herzegovina's improvement of its fight capacity while for the Serbs it did not have any negative impact since it only frizzed the bulk of military superiority that they already had. The imbalance that existed in the arms helped the "ethnic cleansing" campaign of the Serbs. The ethnic cleansing strategy was needed in order to link up and expand the territories the Serbs controlled in Western and Eastern Bosnia and, consequently, create a contiguous Serbian republic between Croatian Krajina and Serbia proper. All, this was done by eliminating non-Serb civilians.

The international community was alarmed by the actions of the Serbs and their policy of "ethnic cleansing". Still, the reaction to the conflict was in stalemate. The justification for the inaction was reduced in very simple words: ethnic conflict in Yugoslavia was explained by four parameters, that is, ethnicity, nationalism and conflict summarized as barbarism, collectivism, spontaneity and isolationism.⁶² For the policy of U.S. this meant Vietnam, in the case of Great Britain another Northern Ireland, for the French - Algeria, Afghanistan for the Russians and

⁶⁰ Reneo Lukic and Alen Lynch, "U.S Policy Towards Yugoslavia: from Differentation to Disintegration". In *South Slav Conflict*, 1996, (ed.by) Thomas, Friman

⁶¹ Resolution 713 (1991), adopted by the Security Council at its 3009th meeting, 25 September 1991. The text in Snezana Trifunovska, *Yugoslavia Through Documents*, op. cit. pp.349-50. For the complete chronology and history of the arms embargo and its strategic aims, see more in Norman Cigar, 1995, *The Rights to Defense. Thoughts on the Bosnian Arms Embargo*. Institute for European Defense and Strategic Studies.

⁶² Radmila Nakarada & Obrad Racic, 1998, *Raspad Jugoslavie, Izazov Evropskoj Bezbednosti*, (*Dissolution of Yugoslavia, Challenge for the European Security*) Institut Za Evropske Studije, pp.21

another Lebanon for all.⁶³ These were all-powerful reasons to avoid the entanglement to the conflict.

First initiatives for ending the conflict were taken in late august 1992. But, the then reached agreement was never implemented. Another initiative was taken in late October 1992, known as Vance-Owen plan and undertaken within the framework of EC's International Conference on the former Yugoslavia. The presented plan awarded the Serbs with the territories that they had in control and was comprehended as a means to appease the Serbs for the end of the fighting. This plan not that only failed to end the fighting, but as a result had a destruction of the Croat-Muslim alliance and the creation of a three-parties conflict.⁶⁴ From the beginning the plan was not backed by the US, considered as being unfair to the Muslims side, although the conflict was redefined after the Clinton took presidency post. The tragic consequence that stemmed from this redefinition was that it considered the conflict as having both elements, those of "civil war" and "the war of aggression". Consequently, the United States were incapable to stop it unilaterally.⁶⁵

In line with the above, the diplomatic improvements to end the fighting have not been in a way. The Clinton promises during his elections, that defeated the republicans with their president Bush, to take a tough policy to end the fighting in

⁶³ Bush compared Bosnia to Lebanon, not to Gulf War. Barton, Gellman and Ann Devroy, "U.S. Weighs for Options on Yugoslavia", *Washington Post*, 11 June 1992, p.1; Eric Schmit, "Reluctant To Use Force, U.S. Is Assessing Sanctions," *New York Times* 1 June 1992, p.8

⁶⁴ Elaine Scolino, "Vance Owen, Bosnia Move is Surprise for Washington," *New York Times*, 31 January 1993, p.10; see for more on James Gow, 1997, Cohen, Broken Bonds, Marko Prelec, "A House Built on Sand, The Western Response to the War in Bosnia". In *Why Bosnia? Writings on Balkan War*, 1993, (ed. by) Rabia Alia & Lawrence Lifschultz, The Pamphleteer's Press, Inc. pp. 191-232

⁶⁵ Anthony Lewis, "More than Bosnia", *New York Times*, 26 april 1992; Anthony Lewis, "The New World Order", *New York Times* 17 May 1992, p.21

Bosnia faded away. During the first year of his incumbency, the policy hardly yielded any tangible result. The only step further had been the establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (1993).⁶⁶ Although the American policy was based on checking Serbian aggression, the efforts of Europeans to end the fighting were directed towards awarding the Serbs. They thought that it was the only way to appease the Serbs. This logic was again approved in Owen-Stoltenberg plan that was a continuation of the previous plan of Vance-Owen. Furthermore, the latter gave to the Serbs more explicit carve-up of Bosnia- Herzegovina than it was envisaged under the Vance-Owen plan⁶⁷

First real steps from the international community with the aim of stopping the war were taken on 2 April 1994 when NATO agreed to mount the first real world operation, pursuing the resolution 816 of the Security Council of 31 March 1993. But, again without final result. Even the fall of Srebrenica in circumstances of unimaginable savagery, would not convince the international community to seriously try ending the fighting⁶⁸. The only diplomatic breakthrough was achieved on 25 March 1994, when the Croatian- Bosnian Accord was brokered in secret by US diplomats who promised to the parties the financial aid for the reconstruction. The US diplomats perceived this as the only way to balance Bosnian Serbs despite the previous Bosnian-Croat heavy fighting .

This alliance brought a major effect in changes in the battlefield in Bosnia- Herzegovina and changed the course of the war towards reaching a settlement that

⁶⁶ David Binder and Walter R. Roberts, *Mediterranean Quarterly* op. cit. pp. 34

⁶⁷ *The United Nations and the Situation in Former Yugoslavia*, (New York: UN Department for Public Information pp. 30-3

⁶⁸ By 23 July, one way or another, the Muslim population of the Srebrenica area had been " virtually eliminated", in circumstances of "unimaginable savagery".

eventually led to the Dayton Agreement of November 1995 . The Dayton Peace Agreement is hardly perfectly designed to fulfill the ambitions of all three parties. Even Holbrooke himself agreed that the plan was not a perfect one, but initially it stopped the fighting.⁶⁹

The core logic of Dayton rests with a military balance of power and the codification of the Serbian aggression.⁷⁰ It was negotiated to support a dubious objective: the objective of nation, where no common sense of national community existed, and the appeasement of the Serbian obsession with self-rule via the ratification of the "Republica Srpska", the Bosnian Serb fiefdom, declared shortly after Bosnia seceded from Yugoslavia in March 1992.

involvement see: Jeremy Drucker, "Srebrenica's Ghosts, Legacy of the Massacre in a Dutch Soldiers Photos", *Transition*, vol.5, no.8 August 1998, pp. 34-35

⁶⁹ Warren Bass, "The Triage of Dayton", *Foreign Affairs* vol.77, no.5 September, October 1998, pp.95-108; Patrick Moore, "Revealing Dayton's Fatal Flaws". *Transition* vol.2 no.4, 12 July 1996 p.5; James A. Schear, "Bosnia's Post- Dayton Traumas". *Foreign Policy* no. 104 fall 1996 pp. 87-102; Pierre Jackuet, "Dayton, IFOR and Alliance Relations in Bosnia", *Survival* vol.38 no.4 Winter 1996-97, pp.45-66

⁷⁰ Charles G. Boyd, "Making Bosnia Work" *Foreign Affairs* vol. 77, no.1, January, February 1998, pp. 42-55. For the perspectives of "Post Dayton Bosnia" see David Chandler, "Democratization in Bosnia: The Limits of Civil Society Building Strategies". In *Democratization*, vol.5, no.4, Winter 1998, pp.78-102 pub.by Frank Class, London

4.4. Kosovo and the FRY: Further Disintegration!?

After the dissolution of former Yugoslavia, Serbia and Montenegro claimed that they were entitled to continue former Yugoslavia's international legal personality. The claim has so far been refuted by the international community. They have to meet the conditions from the EC Guidelines set up within the framework of "Yugoslavia Conference" hosted by Lord Carrington in 1991.⁷¹

With the dissolution of former Yugoslavia, the case of Kosova was regarded as the most dangerous flashpoint in the Balkans. For this reason as early as 1993 George Bush stressed that Milosevic had been warned not to extend the conflict beyond the "red line". That line was stretched in the region of Kosovo⁷². The reason behind this warning was that the conflict in Kosovo would destabilize Albania and two republics of former Yugoslavia, Macedonia and Montenegro. Macedonia comprises 33% of Albanian minority that are not satisfied with their status within the state as does Montenegro with its small minority of Albanian origin. Furthermore, the conflict in Kosova has directly an impact in the balance of power in the triangle between Greece, Bulgaria and Turkey.⁷³

During the time that Milosevic waged wars in other republics of former Yugoslavia, for fulfilling his ambitions and desires from the Greater Serbia

⁷¹ Referring to Opinion No.1 of 9 November 1991, the claim by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to continue automatically the membership of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the United Nations has not been generally accepted. For the full text see Trifunovska, pp. 415-418; 474; 634-640; Alain Pellet, Th Opinions of the Badinter Committee: A Second Breath for the Self- Determination of Peoples. *European Journal of International Law*, vol.3 no.1, 1992

⁷³ Hasan Unal, Courses on "Politics and History in the Balkans", at the Bilkent University, Ankara, February-May 1998

Project, Kosova with the abolition of the 1974, has remained the part of Serbia, and was the most persecuted place in Europe.⁷⁴ Due to the policy of the moderate Albanian leader Ibrahim Rugova, Kosovar Albanians built a parallel life since 1991. The province managed to avoid the war well until 1998. This delicate balance was severely upset, when on 28 February 1998, the Serbian authorities launched the first major large-scale offensive against the ethnic Albanian population, which by mid July had left some 400 dead and forced tens of thousands more to flee their homes and villages.⁷⁵

This conflict was another one triggered by Milosevic, in a long-run series for realization of tasks and duties designated in the lots of early projects and that had one aim: to "ethnically cleanse" the province and then colonize it with the Serb population⁷⁶.

The Wars in Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, were waged with the pretext that all the Serbs should live within one state, being based on the demographic argument that majority population around the Knin were the Serbs, while ignoring historical and political factors which clearly show that there has never been a Serbian state in that area. But when, this argument goes in the favor of other case, as in Kosova were 90% of the population are the Albanians, or in Vojvodina and Sandjak, where the demographic argument was overwhelmingly to the advantage of the non-Serbian population, its force was simply ignored and "political arguments" were brought to

⁷⁴ Helsinki Watch, International Helsinki Federation, Yugoslavia: Crisis in Kosovo, March 1990.

⁷⁵ Tihomir Loza, Special Report Kosovo Albanians: Closing the Ranks, A Journey What Would be the Next Balkan War Zone, (with dispatches from Pristina and Belgrade), *Transitions* vol.5 no.5, May 1998

⁷⁶ Rexhep Qosja, "The Albanian National Question in the Serb Political Programs During 1937-1944". 'The International Journal of Albanian Studies' Vol. I Issue 1 Fall 1997

the fore.⁷⁷ This argument is valid for Bosnia-Herzegovina as well, in which Serbs were never in the majority, and in that case demographic argument has no strength. Even in the legal aspect, there has never been a Serbian state.⁷⁸

Even though the Serbs claim that Kosova is the Serbian part; there are no legal bases for such a claim. Instead of the arguments their demands were based on a web of heroic folklore, myth and legend.⁷⁹ Kosova/o is comprised with 90% of Albanians, and in legal aspects, with the Constitution of 1974, it gained the elements of the classic state by enjoying virtually all the prerogatives of a republic, having its own constitution, government, courts and national bank, and an equal voice within the collective presidency.⁸⁰ When Serbia in 1989 essentially abolished Kosova's autonomy, there started the serious crises that covered the political scene of Yugoslavia, and this case hastened the collapse of Yugoslavia. This was only one step to go on with further action, that of aggressive wars, that revealed what the Serbs were hunting for. In the case of Croatia, the Serbs aimed at controlling the particularly fertile and oil-rich fields in Baranja and Eastern Slavonia, as well the seaside resources of the Adriatic coast.⁸¹ In Bosnia-Herzegovina the retention of a key strategic area and also the location of the bulk of former Yugoslavia's defense industry was aimed at by the Serbs,⁸² a case repeated in Kosovo as well by trying to retain the territory's richest areas in mineral resources, vital to Serbia's economy.⁸³ For that reason the only viable solution for

⁷⁷ Ferid Muhic, Macedonia, and Island on the Balkan Mainland. In *Yugoslavia and After*, 1996, (ed. by) Dyker Vejvoda, pp.240

⁷⁸ *ibid.* pp.240

⁷⁹ Sabrinap. Ramet, Nationalism and the "Idiocy" of the Countryside: The Case of Serbia. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, no.1/96, pp.76-78; William Plaff, An Invitation to War, *Foreign Affairs*, vol.72, no.3, Summer 1993 pp.77-110

⁸⁰ 1974 Constitution, art.4

⁸¹ Slaven Letica, *Genocide After Emotion*, op.cit.pp.91-112

⁸² Christopher Cviic, *The Volatile Powder Keg*, op.cit.pp.107

⁸³ Alexis Heraclides, "The Kosovo Conflict and Its resolution: In Pursuit of Ariadne's Thread", *Security Dialogue*, vo.28, no.3 September 1997, pp.317-333

the Serbs in Kosova case was the partition of the province, in demanding that the wealthiest part to remain within Serbia. This scenario was discarded by the Western leaders after NATO bombing against the FRY started on March 1999.

After the war in Bosnia and the Dayton Agreement, the situation in Kosova/o will change the course of events and the situation will be ramified in different directions. Rugova with his leading peace policy known as "Albanian Gandhi" won an overwhelming support in the 1998 presidential elections of Kosova.⁸⁴ He was able to direct the country through some of its hardest times. Situation in Kosova/o, the poorest region of the former Yugoslavia, had always been difficult, even during second Yugoslavia. As far back as 1977, one of Tito's closest aides, Edvard Kardelj, had warned that: "if the party fails to adopt a resolute policy that would narrow the political gap and tranquilize interethnic tensions in the province, Kosova/o would explode in violence".⁸⁵

After the Kosova/o province fell under full control of the Milosevic regime in 1989, the first undertaken measures were dismissal of the Albanians from their schools considering them as "birth place of the Albanian nationalism", the same steps as during the Kingdom time.⁸⁶ They continued with other measures in expulsion of tens of thousands Albanians from their jobs in state owned enterprises, shut down the Prishtina Television, passed new laws, among them was the law that it made a crime for the Albanians to buy or sell property without

⁸⁴ 24 May 1992, elections for the presidency took place.

⁸⁵ Rilindja, November 8, 1975

⁸⁶ Petrit Imami, *www. danasco.yu*. Fejton Srbi I Albanci Kroz Vekove, september 1988

special permission of the authorities, while arbitrary arrest and police violence directed towards the Albanians become routine practice.⁸⁷

Rugova with his Gandhian-type policy, encouraged the parallel life, and created a society of Albanian-run political, cultural, educational, health and media structures. In this way he managed to create a "Shadow State", with the aim of gaining the independence for Kosova. His rule was based on two principles. The first one was to avoid the open conflicts with the Serb authorities, and the second one was based on the belief that this way is the best one for gradually gaining support of the international community for Kosova's independence, the only aim for the Kosovar Albanians expressed in the referendum of 1991.⁸⁸

To this demand of Albanians the international community showed its reluctance in supporting the independence of Kosova, with the justification that it will not stand for the secessions and a redrawing of international borders.⁸⁹ This biased way was showed earlier when the government of the Kosovar Albanians applied for the international recognition as foreseen by the Badinter Commission that stressed that "Yugoslavia has ceased to exist". The demand was rejected and the response of the Commission was that the provinces could not achieve independence in the same process as republics because they were not endowed with sovereignty.⁹⁰

⁸⁷ Helsinki Watch, Human Rights Abuses in Kosovo 1990-1992, New York: Human Rights Watch 1992; Fabian Schmidt, Kosovo, The Time Bomb That Has Not Gone Off. In *RFE/RL Research Report*, vol.2,no.39,1 October 1993,pp.21-29; Council for the Defence of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in Kosova, [http://albanian.Com/kmdljn/showdoc.cgi?file=english\(mujore\)10.en.htm](http://albanian.Com/kmdljn/showdoc.cgi?file=english(mujore)10.en.htm).

⁸⁸ On 19 October 1991, the Republic of Kosova/o was proclaimed as an independent and a sovereign state, and on 23 October, a provisional coalition government under the leadership of LDK was formed with the urologist Bujar Bukoshi as Prime Minister.

⁸⁹ Benjamin Neuberger, "National Self-Determination, Dilemas of a Concept", *Nations and Nationalism* vol.1, 1 march 1995

⁹⁰ The Kosovo Albanian leadership's argumented that representation on the collective federal Presidency made Kosova/o a sovereign federating unit. This argument as ignored by the Badinter Commision and by the EC; Letter by the Government of the Republic of Kosova/o, to the

When the Dayton Agreement was reached, It did not embrace the Kosova/o issue. It was mentioned only once in the Final Treaty and that in connection with the preconditions for lifting the remaining sanctions against the FRY, or, the so-called "Outer Wall of Sanctions".⁹¹ The reason that Albanians were not included in the Agreement were as follows: *first*, it was felt that there was simply too much to negotiate already with Milosevic, since the obstacle was cooperation with the Tribunal Hague, on handing over to it the war criminals indicted for. *Second*, no one wanted to alienate Milosevic as the "peace maker" who had forced the Bosnian Serbs to accept the compromises, and his cooperation was needed for successful implementation of the Dayton Agreement. And, a *third* reason was that there was an absence of war, and that there was no urgent need to deal with the question.⁹²

The policy led by Ibrahim Rugova contributed substantially to the internationalization of the problem, and for that gained a solid support from most Western Governments. He was received officially by most of them, including the president of the United States.⁹³ But still this policy hardly yielded any concrete, tangible results.

The unresolved issue of Kosova induced more radical groups to think that situation is not going to be solved through the peaceful policy and that only

Extraordinary EPC Ministerial Meeting in Brussels, 21 December 1991. In *The Truth of Kosova*, 1993, (ed. by) Academy of the Sciences of the Republic of Albania, Institute of History, Tirana, Encyclopedia Publishing House, pp. 329; see for more James Gow, 1997, how Kosovars should better argued their position pp.76, footnote no.26.

⁹¹ Janusz Bugajski, Close to the Edge in Kosovo, *The Washington Quarterly*, Summer 1998, vol.21,no.3, pp.19-21; Shkelzen Maliqi, "Beyond Drenica, Crisis of Kosova", *Transitions*, vol.5,no.4, April 1998; Fabian Schmidt, "Teaching the Wrong Lesson in Kosovo". In *Transition*, vol.2,no.14, 12 July 1996, pp.37-39. Original text, UN.DOC.S/1995/999/1995.

⁹² Richard Kaplan, "International Diplomacy and The Crises in Kosovo", *International Affairs*, vol.74, no.4 October 1998, pp.745-761

violence could succeed in winning international recognition. Endless discussions of "preventive diplomacy" and "early warnings mechanisms" did not solve anything. Even the promised International Conference for Kosovo, after the Dayton Agreement, made by Richard Holbrooke and President Clinton did not take place.⁹⁴ As the Serbian repression in Kosovo grew and the international Community remained insensitive to Albanian Kosovar complaints, frustration of the Albanians also grew. This was the psychological basis for the emergence of the Kosovo Liberation Army. The KLA. (In Albanian : UÇK) was the fuse that led to the explosion, especially among the rural areas .⁹⁵ In reaction to the UCK , the Serb authorities found a legitimate pretext for brutally unlawful measures. It was used by Milosevic to provoke widespread Albanian uprising and than to go on with the war and justify the strategy of ethnic cleansing. ⁹⁶

This danger of expanded war has prompted Western leaders to move more quickly against Milosevic than they did in 1991. The U.S Secretary of State Madeleine Albright had already warned that : " We are not going to stand by and watch the Serbian authorities to do in Kosovo what they can no longer get away with doing in Bosnia " .⁹⁷ Reactions of the Great Powers "Contact Group" has limited such Serbian ambitions and pushed Belgrade toward negotiations.

Negotiations were held in Rambolliet, France, during the February of 1999. The Albanian Kosovar Delegation signed the Rambolliet Plan prepared by the "Contact Group" on Yugoslavia. The Plan provided for substantial autonomy and self-

⁹³ Sami Repishti, *Illyria, Newspaper* , 4/5/1999

⁹⁴ Alice Mead, *Illyria Newspaper*, 4/5/1999

⁹⁵ Sasa Zajovic, "Kosovo, Nightmare of the Serbian Dream". In, *Peace News*, March 1997,pp.11-14; Schmidt Fabian," Protest in Serbia Raise Hopes of reconciliation in Kosovo". In *Transition*, vol.3, no.4, 7 March 1997,pp.16-18

⁹⁶ Maliqi, *Transition*, vol.5. no.5, April 1998

government for the people of Kosova over a transitional period of three years. Although this arrangement fell short of what Albanians in Kosova demand and deserve, the Albanian Delegation decided to sign it.⁹⁸ The Serb part did not sign, even though it was seriously threatened that they would face the NATO intervention. Again the international community was convinced that Milosevic knows only the language of the force. And campaign began on 24 March 1999. In response to the NATO intervention, the Serbs again killed the innocent civilians, slaughtered the babies, and massacred scores of people.

Now the question is: would the Kosovar Albanians remain within the claims foreseen by the Rambolliet Plan, being a part of the FRY, or would they push for outright independence ?

The US and the West still staunchly back the stance that to the independence should not be granted to the Kosovar Albanians because that allegedly would create the precedent for the future and would encourage the forces of separation over those of integration. The fragile peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina could be shattered is emphasized in support of the above argument denying the independence for Kosova.⁹⁹ This is the prevailing stance in the West, at least for the time being.

But there are distinctions to be made between the two cases. The war in Bosnia-Herzegovina was a by-product of Yugoslavia's collapse and the borders created there are a result of the policy of ethnic cleansing. The "Republika Srpska" entity

⁹⁷ State Department, *Press Release*, January 27, 1999

⁹⁸ Marc Weller, "The Rambolliet Conference on Kosovo", *International Affairs*, vol.75, no.2, April 1999, pp. 211-252

⁹⁹ Capllan, *International Affairs*, vol.74,no.4, Oct. 1988

did not possess the status of an internal republics with historically defined borders while in the case of Kosova the conflict between the Serbs and Albanians dates as far back as 1912.¹⁰⁰ Besides, the borders of Kosova have been more or less historically defined and its people possess a history of national unity, which was recognised by the Yugoslav Constitutions of 1946 and 1974. Although it was not granted the same official title, that of republic, its borders were demarcated along historical lines to acknowledge the historical unity of the Albanian people of Kosova. These borders could not be changed without the approval of the Parliament of Kosova.¹⁰¹

Kosova with the possession of territorial connection which has remained constant for much of the past 1.000 years and on the basis of possession of a distinct identity based on their shared national heritage, culture, language and ethnicity, should have a right to self-determination. This position is enhanced by the dissolution of the Yugoslavia, since the United States and other major powers have explicitly declined to recognize the self-proclaimed FRY as the continuity of former Yugoslavia.

The self-determination of the Kosova/o would helped the democratization of Serbia, that is, one of the aims of the policy of the West. In this way the Serbs would have been helped to establish a state without national problems, national hatreds and Serbophobia. It is our view as well that the "Serbs have to learn to live without others within their national state."¹⁰² It seems that the saying of a Chinese

¹⁰⁰ John M. Fraser, "The Kosovo Quagmire, What Are the Issues? Should We Care?" *International Journal*, vol. LIII, no.4, 4 Autumn 1998, www.cjia.org/fj.htm

¹⁰¹ Constitution of 1974, art.5, (see for more www.intl-crisis-group.org.9 November, Intermediate Sovereignty as a Basis for Resolution of the Kosovo Crises); Noel Malcolm, "Is Kosovo Real? The Battle Over History Continues", *Foreign Affairs*, January , February 1999, vol.78,no.1

¹⁰² Self-Determination and International Recognition Policy, Yugoslavia-History 1992, World

ruler, Ching the First, that "before there can be brilliant change, there must be chaos" perfectly fits the Kosovar Albanian tragedy.

CONCLUSION

To analyze the origins of the dissolution of Yugoslavia, one has to deal with the very origins of the creation of the Serbo-Croat-Slovene Kingdom, or the first Yugoslavia. As in other parts of Eastern Europe, state building at the time was carried out within the framework of national ideologies which served as a primary instrument of mass mobilization. In the early twentieth century, separate national ideologies created the new Kingdom. The act of its formation in 1918 was contrary to the liberal and democratic concepts. The northern parts of the new state (Slovenia and Croatia) struggled for the confederate type of the common constitutive groups of Serbs-Croats and Slovenes. While the center and the southern part of the state, that is, the Serbs considered that the state should be centralized and led by the Serbs. Therefore, the new state was considered as a continuation of a prewar Kingdom of Serbia.

The Serbs considered their nation dominant for the reason that they had liberated their territories from the Ottoman Empire and then during the Balkan Wars they had stretched their territories including the territories of today's Macedonia and Kosovo. This fact ignited the Serbs to aspire to become the dominant force of the new state that would lead, being the dominant power of the Balkans to, the goals set in the programs of Ilija Garašanin (1844). In the framework of this state other groups living in the Kingdom were treated as second-class citizens, while some non-Slavic populations were not even regarded as minorities. This was the case with the Albanians as a whole who were totally discriminated against in the pre-

war Yugoslavia. Dissatisfaction as to how the state should be influenced the discriminated groups to organize themselves and to cooperate with each other in order to oppose the Serb hegemony. The dissolution of the first Yugoslavia came about when Germany invaded Poland and the Yugoslav government signed Tripartite Pact, and went to exile. The first Yugoslav state broke-up in a civil war and which led some to conclude that it was not a vital one.

During the war all the ethnic oriented political groups lost their credibility with the massacres that they committed, the only viable option that was left was Tito with his comrades promising that the national question will be solved in the rightful manner. This promise paved the way to possibility of the recruitment of all the ethnic groups, including the Albanians and the Hungarians, into the administration. The national question of Albanians was to be resolved at the time by the CPY, but it was not. Kosova/o remained a province within Serbia. Tito was pro-Yugoslav and he was afraid of Serbian nationalism, but at the same time he needed to gain the Serb sympathy because he was seen by Serbs with skepticism. From the outset the federation was centralized, the way that fitted to the Serbs. With the election of Rankovic 1966, (Serb origin minister of interior) the Serbs were provided with the possibility to exercise their influence over Kosova/o, Vojvodina, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia and Montenegro. Tito and the CPY (Communist Party of Yugoslavia) considered that the "brotherhood and unity", and equal status for all nations of Yugoslavia would solve the problem of national question. From 1963 more liberal breath and more liberal thoughts were heard, considering that decision-making process had to shift away from the party toward citizens.

When communist national elite's consolidated their grip on power in the six republics, it was possible to change the constitution for more liberalism. The 1974 constitution created a semiconfederation of semisovereign republics. In these changes Kosova/o gained all the prerogatives of a republic. The wide autonomy granted to Kosova/o offered the Kosovar Albanians an opportunity to check and balance Serbia's aggressive behavior that marked State-running of former Yugoslavia all the time until its dissolution. With the new position of Kosova/o in the balance-of-power politics for a while stopped centralist policy of Belgrade, which had earlier resulted in assimilation and denationalization of Albanians, Muslims and Macedonians. In Tito's Yugoslavia as well, national ideologies were manifested by the national elites, but Tito intervened. We could say that Tito, CPY, and JNA (Yugoslav Army of People's) were the three key components that held the country together. External threat from the Soviet Union after 1968, also contributed to the holding of Yugoslavia together.

With the changes of 1974 constitution, the republics were granted with self-administration, so it was passed from the vertical links on to that of horizontal one. All these republics inside their territory contain minorities of other nationalities. As long as the republics were endowed with the new position, they started to be identified with the majority nation. Especially this form of identification appeared in the late 80s, while other groups were seen as the obstacle toward the realization and determination of self - identity inside their territories. This system directed under the slogan of "brotherhood and unity" was seen as another barrier in the way of their national aspiration. The communist federation on the other hand could not have been sufficient to satisfy the demands for greater autonomy, and was what the

Albanians were looking for in the demonstrations of 1981. Yet, Kosova/o was sacrificed by the Slavic republics of former Yugoslavia.

Besides national ideologies that dominated the scene after Tito's death, self-management as an instrument, created to distinguish the socialist Yugoslav system from the other socialist system, lost its value. From the outset it was applied in the practice with the attitude that the worker should decide for the work and results of the work. In practice it turned out to be the opposite of that, in as much as the worker was needed to attend the meetings and vote at the end of meeting, though the management of the enterprises especially after the 70s were in the hands of local or regional politicians. But this was yet, another factor that led to the further tensions in the overall structure of the society, since the instrument of self-management in the absence of political democracy proved to be fatal.

Self-management had a direct impact on the stagnation of the economy, and at the late of 80s brought about total collapse. Situation was worsened by 1989 when the inflation become very high, 893.8%. With the new moderate Prime Minister Ante Markovic, economy started to revive, but the appearance of Milosevic in the scene from 1987, and his playing with nationalist card rendered the reforms led by Croat Ante Markovic impossible. The fact that witnessed that Yugoslav crises were not of an economic nature any more, but of a political one. After Milosevic came in the scene with the abolishment of constitution of Kosova/o and Vojvodina, and with the idea of creating "Greater Serbia", as it was foreseen in the Memorandum of 1987. The Serbs began to display aggressive nationalism. They began to talk about settling every thing with the use of arms. Appearance of Serb nationalism, was to dominate Yugoslav politics in during the late 80s. In one way or another

provoked other nationalism's as well. The main feature of all the national ideologies of the time was obsession with the nation and the territory. With the domination of nationalism as a national ideology, Yugoslavia had now entered the new phase toward the dissolution.

The national ideology became a driving force in all the republics, in the first multiparty elections in 1990, whereby new national elite's, promoting the national ideologies of the "dominant nation" type, came to power in each of the six republics. In all of them the main aim was to consolidate the new nation-states, the process that was interrupted at the beginning of twentieth century, with the creation of the common state of the South Slavs. Therefore, the causes of the dissolution we found in the first multiparty elections, whereby the republics were striving for new identities, were related to the international environment that had changed with the fall of Berlin wall, and the new policies pursued by Gorbachev. Internal conditions and the external ones, created the possibility for the republics to pursue their independent way, not to continue within the artificial unity, especially after Milosevic came to power in Serbia.

That was how the new elite mobilized their peoples in endorsing their independent states, but the mobilization proved that national ideologies of the Serbs, Croats, Bosnjac Muslims, Albanians and Macedonians were in conflict with each other regarding the territorial demands. The efforts for the transformation of the state of Yugoslavia failed, for the intentions of republics that were diametrically antipodal. For that matter, Slovenia and Croatia continued with the proclamation of the independence. In a response, Serbia continued its policies with violent means, that is by conducting the war against those opposing it. International community

did not intervene, since the Western Governments preferred a common constitutional framework for all of them. This Western approach to the conflict offered Milosevic a wide opportunity to attack one by one others republic first Slovenia, than Croatia and most disastrously Bosnia-Herzegovina. The EC Conference held in London in 1992 proved to be illusory. It should be admitted that in accepting the former internal borders as state borders, the European Community backed the territorial claims of the Slovene, Croat and Bosnian Muslim national ideologies while denying the same claim of the ruling Serb national ideology to the Serb populated areas outside the republic of Serbia. This was a clear signal to the Serbia that it would not be allowed to legalize their policy of ethnic cleansing, for achieving their political aims, that is " Greater Serbia".

In a formal way the establishment of nation states were approved but the European Union and the US administration were not prepared to commit their armed forces to enforce the independence of these the newly recognized states, instead the EU and the UN attempted to negotiate a peaceful settlement between the Serb political leaders and the newly recognized governments. This way of handling the war did not produce any results, nor did it stop the fighting in the Bosnia-Herzegovina. Alliance of the Croats and Bosniac Muslims helped them to conquer formerly Serb-held areas in Croatia, and large areas of Western Bosnia, expelling Serb population as well. It was the first diplomatic breakthrough in 1995 after the 3,5 years war, that brought about the peace process signed in November 1995(Dayton Agreement). As during the history, these territories have never been partitioned in a peaceful way to satisfy all the national elites involved, this time as

well Dayton Peace Agreement failed to satisfy the territorial claims of either the Bosnian Muslims or of the Bosnian Serb elites.

In the process of dissolution of former Yugoslavia, just as the other republics, Kosova/o strove for its independence statehood. Its majority population and the state structures declared Kosova/o as a republic (Declaration of 2 July 1990 and the Constitution of September 1990 respectively). Based on these acts, Kosova/o held its referendum for independence in September 1991 and asked for international recognition of its independent statehood. The request of Kosova/o, submitted on 20 December 1991, was not met positively by the then EC Conference on Yugoslavia. The answer was that " provinces are not endowed with sovereignty". The common justification was that it would be a precedent for the future and would encourage the forces of separation. In turn, it might have an impact on shattering the fragile peace of Dayton. The fact is that, Kosova/o was different, and that could not be compared to the Serbian entities created violently in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Difference, first of all was based on demographic argument, Kosova/o is populated with 90% of Albanians. And the second argument why Kosova/o is different, is that the borders created in the " Republika Srpska" entity were created violently by ethnically cleansing the non-Serb population, and that this borders did not possess the status of an international republics with historically defined borders, while in the case of Kosova/o, possession of the territorial connection has remained constant for much of the past. Therefore, the independence of Kosova/o would help for the future, the national ideologies would not be used as the principal instrument of political mobilization in the Balkans. And the Serbs would live within their own national state.

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